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PREDICTING OUTCOMES IN INVESTMENT 
TREATY ARBITRATION 
SUSAN D. FRANCK & LINDSEY E. WYLIE† 
  Crafting appropriate dispute settlement processes is challenging for 
any conflict-management system, particularly for politically sensitive 
international economic law disputes. As the United States negotiates 
investment treaties with Asian and European countries, the terms of 
dispute settlement have become contentious. There is a vigorous 
debate about whether investment treaty arbitration (ITA) is an 
appropriate dispute settlement mechanism. While some sing the 
praises of ITA, others offer a spirited critique. Some critics claim that 
ITA is biased against states, while others suggest ITA is predictable 
but unfair due to factors like arbitrator identity or venue. Using data 
from 159 final cases derived from 272 publicly available ITA awards, 
this Article examines outcomes of ITA cases to explore those 
concerns. Key descriptive findings demonstrate that states reliably 
won a greater proportion of cases than investors; and for the subset of 
cases investors won, the mean award was US$45.6 million with mean 
investor success rate of 35%. State success rates were roughly similar 
to respondent-favorable or state-favorable results in whistleblowing, 
qui tam, and medical-malpractice litigation in U.S. courts. The Article 
then explores whether ITA outcomes varied depending upon investor 
identity, state identity, the presence of repeat-player counsel, 
arbitrator-related, or venue variables. Models using case-based 
variables always predicted outcomes whereas arbitrator-venue models 
did not. The results provide initial evidence that the most critical 
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variables for predicting outcomes involved some form of investor 
identity and the experience of parties’ lawyers. For investor identity, 
the most robust predictor was whether investors were human beings, 
with cases brought by people exhibiting greater success than 
corporations; and when at least one named investor or corporate 
parent was ranked in the Financial Times 500, investors sometimes 
secured more favorable outcomes. Following Marc Galanter’s 
scholarship demonstrating that repeat-player lawyers are critical to 
litigation outcomes, attorney experience also affected ITA outcomes. 
Investors with experienced counsel were more likely to obtain a 
damage award against a state, whereas states retaining experienced 
counsel were only reliably associated with decreased levels of relative 
investor success. Although there was variation in outcomes, 
ultimately, the data did not support a conclusion that ITA was 
completely unpredictable; rather, the results called into question some 
critiques of ITA and did not prove that ITA is a wholly unacceptable 
form of dispute settlement. Instead, the results suggest the vital debate 
about ITA’s future would be well served by focusing on evidence-
based insights and reliance on data rather than nonreplicable 
intuition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite experiencing a period of fiscal adjustment, worldwide 
investment remains a lynchpin of global economic activity and 
involves trillions of dollars.1 Governments across the world are now 
focusing upon how to best use bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties as strategic tools to increase their economic prosperity.2 
Given their potential value in promoting economic competitiveness 
within the global economy,3 President Obama’s 2015 State of the 
Union Address focused on international economic treaties.4 The 
 
 1. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 
2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies, at 84–86, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2012 (May 7, 2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WIR 2012]. In 2012, for example, 
total worldwide foreign-direct-investment stock was approximately US$23 trillion. United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value 
Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, at xv, 217 annex tbl. 2, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2013 (June 27, 2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WIR 2013]. 
 2. Canada recently finished negotiating an investment treaty with the European Union. 
See Freya Baetens, Gerard Kreijen & Andrea Varga, Determining International Responsibility 
Under the New Extra-EU Investment Agreements: What Foreign Investors in the EU Should 
Know, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1203, 1218 n.66 (2014) (discussing CETA’s terms finalized, 
which were in September 2014); Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA), CAN. FOREIGN AFF., TRADE & DEV., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/index.aspx?lang=eng [http://perma.cc/KZ
7T-TXC6] (last updated June 12, 2015) (providing information on CETA).  
 3. See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth About 
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 706–08 (observing that early studies showed minimal evidence of a 
connection between investment treaties and foreign investment, and that the majority of 
empirical analysis and even “[t]he most sophisticated studies consider possible alternative 
explanatory variables and still find that [treaties] that provide for investor-State arbitration are 
correlated with increased investment.”). But see Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 397, 399 (2011) (gathering literature that suggests mixed evidence linking the presence 
of an investment treaty and derivative investment). 
 4. Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-
address-january-20-2015 [http://perma.cc/U9N4-UGAN]. After this Article was accepted for 
publication, President Obama signed the Trade Promotion Authority Act that will permit the 
Executive Branch to continue negotiating investment-related treaties. David Nakamura, In 
Bipartisan Ceremony, Obama Signs Trade Legislation, Calls for Infrastructure Bill, WASH. POST 
(June 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/06/29/in-bipartisan-
ceremony-obama-signs-trade-legislation-calls-for-infrastructure-bill [http://perma.cc/7Q7T-KF
KY]; Greg Nelson, On Trade, Here’s What the President Signed into Law, WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(June 29, 2015, 3:55 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/06/29/trade-here-s-what-
president-signed-law [http://perma.cc/TV3G-4KTA]; see also infra notes 16–18 (discussing 
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United States is negotiating multilateral investment agreements with 
trading partners across the globe, including the recently signed Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP),5 and the European Union–United States 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).6 Meanwhile, 
President Obama has initiated negotiation of bilateral investment 
treaties with key trading partners, including India7 and China.8 
The existing web of signed international investment agreements 
(IIAs) exceeds three thousand bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties.9 Those IIAs grant various substantive rights, including the 
right to compensation for government expropriation and freedom 
from discrimination, to people or entities investing abroad.10 In 
 
public debates about ITA and the President’s authority to negotiate agreements). The playing 
field of treaty negotiation will continue to evolve over the coming months and years, as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed but the text was not released until final revisions to 
this Article. 
 5. Twelve countries in the Asia-Pacific region—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam—signed the 
TPP on October 5, 2015. David Nakamura, Deal Reached on Pacific Rim Trade Pact in Boost 
for Obama Economic Agenda, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/deal-reached-on-pacific-rim-trade-pact/2015/10/05/7c567f00-6b56-11e5-b31c-
d80d62b53e28_story.html [http://perma.cc/JHJ6-RCKT]; see also Michael Froman, Remarks by 
Ambassador Michael Froman at the Council on Foreign Relations the Strategic Logic of Trade, 
20 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 373, 375 (2014) (discussing TPP and how it will cover 50% of global 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)); David P. Vincent, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
Environmental Savior or Regulatory Carte Blanche?, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (2014) 
(“[E]xisting TPP countries have a combined GDP of close to $20 trillion and a combined 
population of over 650 million.”).  
 6. See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 696–97 (stating that TPP and TTIP could 
“govern the investment relations of 65% of the world economy”); Mark Weaver, The Proposed 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): ISDS Provisions, Reconciliation, and 
Future Trade Implications, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 225, 226 (2014) (discussing the history of 
TTIP). 
 7. On January 26, 2015, President Obama met Indian government officials to promote a 
U.S.-India bilateral investment treaty. See Remarks by President Obama at U.S.-India Business 
Council Summit, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/01/26/remarks-president-obama-us-india-business-council-summit [http://perma.cc/
G3FE-M97A]; Kavaljit Singh, India/US Bilateral Investment Treaty Will Be No Easy Ride, FIN. 
TIMES: BEYONDBRICS (Jan. 2, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/01/26/guest-post-
india-us-bilateral-investment-treaty-will-be-no-easy-ride/ [http://perma.cc/GA7Z-6PAA].  
 8. See John R. Crook, China Agrees to Resume Expanded Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Negotiations with United States, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 947, 947–48 (2013) (observing that the 
United States and China agreed to restart negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty). 
 9. See, e.g., Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in 
Sustainable Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 523–24 (2013) (discussing the 
historical rise in the number of investment treaties from one IIA in 1959 to over 3,000 signed 
IIAs in 2010). 
 10. See infra notes 43–45 (discussing substantive rights in IIAs). 
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derogation of traditional international law principles where only 
states can pursue international law remedies,11 IIAs contain ex ante 
promises whereby states guarantee investors a forum to seek direct 
redress for violations of substantive rights. In combination, the scope 
of existing investment flows and treaties means a meaningful 
proportion of international investment is currently protected by at 
least one IIA and theoretically subject to treaty-based arbitration.12 
As investors have exercised their new international law rights to 
redress alleged grievances, theoretical risk has become a reality. The 
first investment treaty arbitration (ITA) award came in 1990,13 and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) estimated that, by 2014, claimants had initiated over five 
hundred formal disputes.14 
With increased political, economic, and legal scrutiny on 
international investment, ITA has become the center of debate in the 
negotiation of international economic law treaties, particularly for 
TPP and TTIP;15 spawned articles in the New York Times,16 
 
 11. See Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2543, 2547 (2014) 
(“[I]nvestor-state arbitration is something of an anomaly in international law because states 
waive their sovereign immunity and make themselves vulnerable to legal claims by foreign 
litigants alleging that they violated their international obligations as defined by treaty.”). In the 
future, it may be worth exploring whether the anomaly, which provides individuals or entities 
with direct access to arbitration for international law violations causing damage, might extend to 
other international law wrongs affecting individuals. 
 12. See UNCTAD, WIR 2013, supra note 1, at 217.  
 13. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, 
¶ 18 (June 27, 1990), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1034.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/SN5Q-45PB]. 
 14. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, IIA Issues Note: Recent 
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), No. 1, at 9–10, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2014/3 (Apr. 2014), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/web
diaepcb2014d3_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CG5-HQA2] (suggesting the number of concluded 
cases is more than 270, but failing to explain the definition for “concluded” cases to permit 
comparison to existing datasets). But see JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 331 n.1 (2013) (“From 1960 through mid-1974, some 62 different 
developing countries engaged in 875 nationalizations or takeovers of foreign enterprises.”).  
 15. Leon E. Trakman, Investment Dispute Resolution Under the Proposed Transpacific 
Partnership Agreement: Prelude to a Slippery Slope?, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COMM. L. 1, 1–2 
(2013) [hereinafter Trakman, TPP]; see also Sebastian Perry, Public Consultation Opens on EU-
US Treaty, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 28, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/
32531/public-consultation-opens-eu-us-treaty [http://perma.cc/RU3B-PWKD] (discussing the 
European Union’s public consultation on including ITA in TTIP); Germany to Reject EU-
Canada Trade Deal - Sueddeutsche Newspaper, REUTERS (July 26, 2014, 8:05 AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/07/26/germany-canada-trade-idUSL6N0Q10CS20140726?irpc=932&
ref=browsi [http://perma.cc/4HFY-U8WN] (suggesting Germany will reject a European Union 
trade treaty primarily because of ITA). 
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Washington Post,17 Wall Street Journal18 and The Economist;19 and 
generated a robust congressional debate.20 Some stakeholders express 
concerns that ITA is unpredictable, illegitimate, or exhibits a pro-
investor bias;21 yet others disagree22 and contend that these 
 
 16. Manuel Pérez-Rocha, Opinion, When Corporations Sue Governments, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/when-corporations-sue-
governments.html [http://perma.cc/XPR7-TG7E]; Jonathan Weisman, Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Seen as Door for Foreign Suits Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015), http://mobile.nytimes.
com/2015/03/26/business/trans-pacific-partnership-seen-as-door-for-foreign-suits-against-us.html 
[http://perma.cc/CD9M-863T].  
 17. Henry Farrell, People Are Freaking Out About the Trans Pacific Partnership’s Investor 
Dispute Settlement System. Why Should You Care?, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 26, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/26/people-are-freaking-
out-about-the-trans-pacific-partnerships-investor-dispute-settlement-system-why-should-you-
care [http://perma.cc/HPN6-28KR]; Greg Sargent, Elizabeth Warren Fires Back at Obama: 
Here’s What They’re Really Fighting About, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (May 11, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/05/11/elizabeth-warren-fires-back-at-
obama-heres-what-theyre-really-fighting-about [https://perma.cc/8ZUT-VHYM]; Greg Sargent, 
Is TPP Trade Deal a Massive Giveaway to Major Corporations? An Exchange Between Obama 
and Sherrod Brown, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/04/27/is-tpp-trade-deal-a-massive-giveaway-to-major-
corporations-an-exchange-between-obama-and-sherrod-brown [http://perma.cc/ZKV2-CT25].  
 18. William Mauldin, Dispute-Resolution System Fuels Criticism of Pacific Trade Pact, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dispute-resolution-system-
fuels-criticism-of-pacific-trade-pact-1425330853 [http://perma.cc/ZAG4-NKP8].  
 19. Editorial, The Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), http://
www.economist. com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-
protect-foreign-investors-arbitration [http://perma.cc/QU53-CZU9].  
 20. See generally Susan Davis, Senate Agrees to Debate ‘Fast Track’ Trade Bill, USA 
TODAY (May 14, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/05/14/senate-trade-
vote-fast-track/27306255 [http://perma.cc/XJ2S-DHXP] (discussing the Senate’s vote to begin 
debate on TPA); Paul Kane, Obama Wins Trade Victory in the Senate, WASH. POST (May 22, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-wins-trade-victory-in-the-senate/2015/05/
22/1cb6958e-00c7-11e5-8b6c-0dcce21e223d_story.html [http://perma.cc/TRN9-58SG] (same). 
 21. See, e.g., Efraim Chalamish, Do Treaties Matter? On Effectiveness and International 
Economic Law, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 325, 336 (2011) (book review) (describing several Latin 
American countries’ criticism of pro-investor bias in ITA); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy 
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through 
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy 
Crisis] (discussing problems of legitimacy through inconsistent awards); Asha Kaushal, Revising 
History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 491, 510 (2009) (arguing ITA awards are “unpredictable” and “extremely 
generous to foreign corporations”); Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System of Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: An Overview 11 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper 
No. 2006/1, 2006) (discussing problems deriving from inconsistency).  
 22. Compare PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW 
LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION BOOM (2012), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/
profiting-from-injustice.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZRR4-2GGY] (arguing international arbitration 
favors investors), with Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From “Dealing in Virtue” to 
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“objections that began as ideologically driven polemics have come to 
be widely, but inaccurately, presumed as truths.”23 These competing 
perspectives demand reexamination of how investment treaty 
disputes should be resolved.24 The European Union is engaged in a 
consultation process exploring the value of ITA,25 and the United 
States likewise continues to debate ITA.26 Some have proposed 
alternative or supplementary methods of managing investment treaty 
conflict,27 whereas others advocate wholesale elimination of ITA.28 In 
 
“Profiting from Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Statification” of Investment Dispute Settlement, 
55 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE (Jan. 2014), http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/Brower_Blanchard_to_Publish.pdf [http://perma.cc/MC3G-FUSH] (arguing investment 
arbitration provides a neutral forum for dispute resolution). 
 23. Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 699. 
 24. See generally MICHAEL WAIBEL, ASHA KAUSHAL, KYO-HWA CHUNG & CLAIRE 
BALCHIN, THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 
(2010); Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A 
New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 553 (2013) (“For 
arbitration law and practice to effectively respond to criticism about the integrity of arbitration, 
the focus of our inquiry should include not only apparent bias associated with individual 
arbitrators, but also implicit and systemic bias.”); Kaushal, supra note 21 (discussing the 
development of the international investment regime). 
 25. Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) 
(European Commission Working Document, No. SWD(2015)3 final, Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf [http://perma.cc/SWG2-FW7P]. The 
European approach to ITA remains in flux. While this Article was being revised for publication, 
the European Union Parliament issued detailed proposals for an international investment court 
to settle investment disputes. Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and 
Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2015), http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1364 [http://perma.cc/D7MF-BNJK]. As these 
normative reforms are ongoing and were made a few weeks prior to publication, they are 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
 26. See Sarah A. Altschuller, Amy Lehr & Suzanne A. Spears, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 44 INT’L LAW. 213, 218 (2010) (observing the U.S. State Department’s Advisory 
Committee on International Economic Policy “showed serious divisions existed between 
members of the subcommittee that drafted the report on this issue”); Report of the 
Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy 
Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Annexes, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 
30, 2009), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2009/131118.htm [http://perma.cc/B2T2-DZHN] 
(exploring the text of a U.S. model investment treaty); supra notes 18, 20 (describing May 2015 
congressional debates over “fast track” authority to prospectively authorize investment 
treaties); see also Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 
775, 864–67 (2012) (discussing the importance of arbitration in international affairs).  
 27. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems 
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 196, 207–28 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, DSD] (exploring the 
potential use of mediation and dispute systems design methodologies into investment-treaty 
conflict); Susan D. Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict 
Management: An Introductory Guide, 29 ICSID REV. 66, 67–68 (2014) [hereinafter Franck, 
Mediation] (discussing the future of investor-state mediation); Anna Joubin-Bret & Barton 
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response, some states have exited the international investment law 
regime, while others rely on preexisting paradigms for dispute 
settlement.29 
In the midst of debates about whether to retain, or even increase, 
the scope of arbitration by renewing existing IIAs or generating new 
investment treaties,30 there is a dearth of empirical research 
quantitatively analyzing ITA outcomes. Despite some literature 
focusing on jurisdictional decisions,31 little quantitative research has 
explored final outcomes or otherwise identified variables reliably 
associated with results.32 Identifying these factors, however, is vital to 
informed debates about the normative design of dispute resolution. 
 
Legum, A Set of Rules Dedicated to Investor-State Mediation: The IBA Investor-State Mediation 
Rules, 29 ICSID REV. 17, 23 (2014) (suggesting mediation as an alternative to arbitration); 
Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 72 (2013) (recommending 
integration of mediation to facilitate “trust-building and information exchange regarding 
important underlying interests”). 
 28. See, e.g., infra notes 71–93 and accompanying text (discussing calls for reform related to 
eliminating ITA or placing disputes into the hands of national court judges). 
 29. See, e.g., Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 
NEB. L. REV. 313, 314–16, 326–28, 338–47 (2014) (discussing the exit and entry of states in the 
international investment regime). 
 30. Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 697 (estimating that 1300 IIAs were eligible for 
renegotiation in 2013). 
 31. See generally Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An 
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301 (2008) (analyzing jurisdictional decisions, 
preliminary measures, interpretations, and annulments but not final awards); Kathleen S. 
McArthur & Pablo A. Ormachea, International Investor-State Arbitration: An Empirical 
Analysis of ICSID Decisions on Jurisdiction, 28 REV. LIT. 559 (2009) (analyzing ICSID 
jurisdiction awards); Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behavior in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An 
Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211 (2012) (analyzing 
jurisdictional awards); infra note 142 (identifying recently published research on ITA). 
 32. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Empirically Evaluating] (providing 
descriptive data about ITA outcomes); see generally Susan D. Franck, Development and 
Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, 
Development] (analyzing outcomes as a function of respondent and presiding arbitrator 
development status); Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in 
Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825 (2011) [hereinafter Franck, ICSID] (analyzing 
variations in outcomes as a function of cases against Latin American states, energy disputes, 
applicable law and venue); Daphna Kapeliuk, Collegial Games: Analyzing the Effect of Panel 
Composition on Outcome in Investment Arbitration, 31 REV. LITIG. 267 (2012) [hereinafter 
Kapeliuk, Games] (exploring panel effects and outcomes); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat 
Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 47 (2010) [hereinafter Kapeliuk, Repeat Appointment] (analyzing final outcomes as a 
function of those rendered by “elite” arbitrators). 
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This Article first offers an overview of the doctrine and debate 
surrounding ITA. Second, it explains the data and methodology 
underlying the analyses. Third, it provides descriptive data of ITA 
outcomes. It identifies that the mean amounts claimed were 
approximately US$660 million (US$100 million median), which 
reflects a nontrivial risk of loss of fiscal resources for both investors 
and states, particularly for small investors and developing states. 
Despite the risk of fiscal exposure for states, states won 
approximately 60% of the cases, and states won reliably more often 
than investors. Turning to amounts awarded, for the set of all cases 
that included investor losses, the average amount awarded was 
US$16.6 million (US$0 median) and the average investor success rate 
was 18% (2% median). Focusing exclusively on the small subset of 
cases where investors obtained damages, investors obtained a mean 
award of US$45.6 million (US$10.9 million median) and an average 
success rate of 35% (29% median). 
Next, given the variation in outcomes, the Article tests different 
models to predict ITA outcomes. Historically, empirical research has 
not attempted to test holistic theories of ITA outcomes, and has 
rather focused on a limited number of variables.33 As ITA is 
undertheorized,34 discussions about factors influencing outcomes are 
not theoretically cohesive; rather, explanatory narratives generally 
derive from intuition or conventional wisdom.35 This perhaps explains 
why previous research was more limited in scope.36 One potential 
 
 33. See, e.g., Franck, Development, supra note 32, at 444–49 (analyzing only presiding 
arbitrators, respondents and the interaction effect on ITA outcomes); Franck, ICSID, supra 
note 32, at 85194 (conducting separate analyses to analyze the impact of Latin American 
respondents, presiding arbitrators, and venue but limiting the analyses to roughly three 
variables in any given model); see also infra text accompanying note 174 (exploring limits in 
historical research).  
 34. See Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment 
Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 46 (2013) (“[T]he system as a whole is new and 
undertheorized.”); Frédéric G. Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory: Developing International Law on 
Investment Protection as Common Law, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 181, 183–85 (2014) (exploring 
the absence of an underpinning theory for international investment law); see also Diane A. 
Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations 
and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 51, 58–59 (2014) (describing aspects of 
international investment law, and the intersection with international trade law, as “piecemeal 
and unplanned, lacking a unifying logic”). 
 35. See generally Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 691–99. 
 36. Another explanation was, as ITA is a relatively nascent area of law with a smaller 
caseload, datasets were necessarily smaller and lacked the statistical power to conduct more 
sophisticated multivariate analyses. See Susan D. Franck, Calvin P. Garvin & Jenna M. Perkins, 
Through the Looking Glass: Understanding Social Science Norms for Analyzing International 
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paradigm to explain ITA outcomes focuses on adjudicative factors, 
namely arbitrators and venue, as the variables vital to outcomes.37 A 
second paradigm involves case-related variables like claimant 
identity, respondent identity, and the expertise of each party’s 
lawyers.38 The analyses revealed that, although models focusing on 
arbitrators and venue were never significant, case-based models 
always predicted outcomes. The most reliable predictors of outcomes 
were permutations of investor identity and experience of parties’ 
lawyers. Regarding investor identity, the most robust predictor was 
whether the investors were human beings or corporations, with cases 
brought by people exhibiting greater success than corporations; and 
there was some evidence that Financial Times 500 (FT500) investors 
had greater success than others in some, but not all, types of 
outcomes. Regarding attorneys, investors retaining experienced 
counsel were generally more likely to obtain favorable results, but for 
states, retaining experienced counsel was only linked to decreased 
levels of relative investor success. A hybrid model using any 
significant predictor from earlier models also reliably predicted case 
outcomes and exhibited a large effect size. Whether investors were 
people and the expertise of respondents’ legal team remained 
significant predictors of relative investor success.39 
Fifth, the Article identifies limitations of the research related to 
case selection, external validity, underspecification of models, and 
statistical power for the non-significant arbitrator-venue models. 
Sixth, the Article synthesizes and interprets the data. While the 
descriptive data indicate that investors won some cases, the results 
disrupt claims that ITA exhibits a “pro-investor” bias;40 instead, they 
offer preliminary evidence of a pro-state bias. The regression models 
 
Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2010-2011, at 
883, 884, 896–900 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011) (identifying how previous research with smaller 
samples had limited statistical power but explaining how effect-sizes identified the lack of a 
large- or medium-sized effect). 
 37. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.  
 38. See infra notes 84–86; see also Bohuslav Klein, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment 
Arbitration? Are Investors and Host States on a Level Playing Field?, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 
65, 67 (2005) (arguing for a case-based approach to identifying proper ITA outcomes); 
Sourgens, supra note 34, at 223–31 (arguing for case-by-case focus of ITA outcomes). 
 39. Aspects of this research are described in greater detail in SUSAN D. FRANCK, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: MYTHS, REALITIES, AND COSTS (forthcoming Oxford 
University Press 2016). 
 40. See Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated 
Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367, 378 (2014) (identifying claims that ITA is 
“imbalanced, and biased in favor of foreign investors”).  
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did not support claims that ITA outcomes were random. Rather, even 
with variation, investor identity and counsel expertise were the most 
reliable predictors of ITA outcomes. For investor identity, cases with 
only human claimants fared better than their corporate counterparts; 
and in some instances, cases involving at least one FT500 entity 
achieved more favorable outcomes than those without an FT500 
entity. While expertise of investor counsel was critical in models 
related to outcomes that generated state liability or amounts 
awarded, the expertise of state counsel predicted lower rates of 
relative investor success. Variables—like respondent identity 
(particularly state-development status and democracy levels), the 
background of the tribunal as a whole, and the presence of repeat 
arbitrators—might in the future be useful predictors of ITA 
outcomes.41 None of the models identified a reliable link between 
outcomes and the tribunal’s gender composition or whether the 
arbitration venue was International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). These data call into question 
conventional characterizations of ITA and undermine derivative 
policy proposals recommending complete elimination of ITA. Future 
research should replicate these analyses to explore whether other 
aspects better explain ITA outcomes. In the interim, the results 
suggest that debates about the future of ITA should remain robust. 
Nevertheless, focusing on evidence-based insights, relying on data, 
and minimizing emotive reactions that induce nonreplicable intuition 
would best serve the debate. 
I.  DOCTRINE AND DEBATE ABOUT INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION 
ITA is a sui generis hybrid of public and private international 
law; it permits investors to vindicate substantive treaty rights that 
states granted to investors by directly suing states for government 
conduct that allegedly breached a treaty and created an adverse effect 
on a foreign investment.42 To understand this relatively recent 
 
 41. It is possible that some variables are co-linear or result in confusion about inferential 
attribution. See Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and Development? Examining Investment 
Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 13, 14 (2014) [hereinafter Franck, Conflating] 
(failing to identify, after controlling for state democracy levels, any analyses locating reliable 
links between outcome and respondent development status). 
 42. JOSE E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 38–39 (2011); KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, 
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international law phenomenon, the next part first explores the 
doctrine and policy underlying ITA. After describing the mechanics 
of ITA, it then highlights the derivative debate about ITA. 
A. The Doctrine and Policy of ITA 
The net objective of an IIA is to entice inbound foreign 
investment and to protect a state’s own investors abroad while 
minimizing the risk of state liability. IIAs grant reciprocal investment 
rights—of a procedural and substantive nature—to foreign investors 
from the signatory countries.43 Procedurally, IIAs offer clear dispute 
resolution rights, including the right to arbitrate treaty disputes. After 
complying with certain prerequisites, including submitting dispute 
notices and attempting amicable settlement, IIAs permit investors to 
initiate arbitration directly against a state.44 Substantively, IIAs 
involve state promises that foreign investors will receive certain basic 
treatment, including the right to freedom from expropriation without 
proper compensation, the right to freedom from discrimination, and 
guarantees of fair and equitable treatment. These rights are similar to 
some, but not all, constitutional rights.45 Some ITA disputes involve 
 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 370 (2013); see also 
Roberts, supra note 34, at 45–46. 
 43. In some, but certainly not all instances, IIAs secure the intended benefit of foreign 
investment. See Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment 
Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT’L ORG. 401, 429 (2011) (discussing the 
utility of IIAs and securing investment flows, given threatened or successful ITA disputes); 
Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-
Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L ORG. 1, 28 (2011) 
(reviewing conditions where IIAs are linked with increased investment). Compare Todd Allee 
& Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over 
Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1 (2010) (arguing that dispute resolution 
provisions in bilateral investment treaties lead to differences in investment), with Yackee, supra 
note 3 (suggesting there is minimal difference that dispute resolution provisions in treaties are 
linked to investment flows).  
 44. ITA prevents blanket claims of immunity from suit—whether by virtue of the 
sovereign-immunity or political-question doctrine—that might otherwise prevent investors from 
bringing claims in national courts. See, e.g., Stephen E. Blythe, The Advantages of Investor-State 
Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 47 INT’L LAW. 
273, 274–79 (2013). IIAs also permit direct state-to-state dispute settlement of an investor’s 
disputes under an IIA. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid 
Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretative Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1, 
5–10 (2014). 
 45. See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 767 (2000); see also Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of 
Investor Rights under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 48 (2005) (“These investment treaties act like economic bills of 
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public law elements, like Zimbabwe’s expropriation of land belonging 
to certain white farmers or the imposition of an environmental 
regulation that has a de facto disparate impact on foreign 
companies.46 Other disputes have a more commercial flavor, like 
revocation of a banking license, breach of contract, or failure to pay a 
dividend.47 Irrespective of whether they are representative, some ITA 
disputes have become iconic. For example, investors sued Argentina 
for its 2001 currency crisis that led to damages deriving from the 
devaluation of the Argentine peso and Argentina’s imposition of 
other emergency measures to stabilize its economy;48 and Philip 
Morris sued Australia and Uruguay for plain-packaging cigarette 
regulations claiming state administrative regulation of cigarette 
packages constituted unlawful expropriation of intellectual property.49 
Historically, there were few options for investors to redress state 
activity that adversely affected their foreign investments.50 Investors’ 
informal options entailed ignoring the conflict, absorbing the cost, 
and pricing the investment accordingly. Other options included 
securing political risk insurance coverage or otherwise asking the 
investor’s home state to provide diplomatic support. More formal 
options for resolving international investment disputes included 
declarations of war, exercises of “gunboat diplomacy,” lobbying the 
investor’s home state to invoke formal diplomatic relief, or soliciting 
an investor’s home state to espouse its claim at the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).51 These options were largely unsatisfactory as 
 
rights, which grant foreign investors substantive protections and procedural rights to facilitate 
investment.”). 
 46. Franck, Conflating, supra note 41, at 21 n.25. 
 47. See, e.g., Ross P. Buckley & Paul Blyschak, Guarding the Open Door: Non-Party 
Participation before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22 BANKING 
& FIN. L. REV. 353, 366 (2007); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in 
International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 712–13 (2007). 
 48. See generally ALVAREZ, supra note 42 (compiling cases). 
 49. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 4–9 (July 2, 2s013) http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1531.pdf [http://perma.cc/SQ99-ASW8]; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. 
Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, 
¶¶ 1.4–1.7, 7.3–7.5 (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
0665.pdf [http://perma.cc/38TS-VUQX]. 
 50. Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a State’s 
Regulatory Autonomy Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 245, 246–47 (2012); 
Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 757–79. 
 51. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 1–25 (2012) (discussing the history of international investment law); Roberts, 
supra note 44, at 3, 15–17, 44–45 (discussing gunboat diplomacy, diplomatic protection, other 
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they generated large fiscal costs, politicized dispute resolution by 
situating it within the sphere of international relations, prohibited 
direct access to neutral dispute resolution, or otherwise failed to 
provide a remedy to a damaged investor.52  
Against this backdrop, states signed IIAs to clarify substantive 
rights and grant investors the capacity to pursue direct dispute 
resolution for international investment law violations. ITA provided 
investors with a direct forum for depoliticized adjudication that is 
conducted by arbitrators who are required to be independent and 
impartial and generates an enforceable award.53 The objective was for 
states to avoid deciding whether to espouse an investor’s claim and 
instead let investors choose, in light of net costs and benefits, whether 
pursuing a claim was appropriate.54 ITA used a tried and tested 
process—namely international arbitration—whose historical pedigree 
offered an opportunity for adjudicative neutrality and an established 
enforcement regime. In theory, ITA generated a balanced and 
efficient form of dispute resolution that minimized commercial risk 
and maximized rule of law.55 
 
forms of state-initiated dispute resolution, and the history of ITA); Jason Webb Yackee, 
Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 391, 392–95, 406–08 
(2012) (discussing historical options for dispute settlement in international investment law). 
Although domestic dispute resolution was also available under domestic law through domestic 
courts, even today, not all states exhibit comparative levels of rule of law. See generally TOM 
GINSBURG & TAMIR MOUSTAFA, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (2008) (discussing judicial empowerment in authoritarian regimes); 
Mark Fathi Massoud, International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian States, 39 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2014) (arguing that authoritarian regimes benefit from embracing 
international arbitration). See also Xin He & Yang Su, Do “Haves” Come Out Ahead in 
Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 120, 132, 138 (2013) (identifying 
government agencies or government-related companies as the biggest winners in Shanghai 
courts). 
 52. See Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based 
Empirical Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 465, 471–75 (2013) (discussing the origin of investor-
state dispute settlement).  
 53. MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (1st ed. 2008); Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in 
International Investment Arbitration, 35 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 431, 451–53 (2013); Dominique 
Hascher, Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: 3 Issues, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. 789, 791–92 
(2012). 
 54. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 51–52 (2009). 
 55. SCHEFER, supra note 42, at 1–10, 509–14. 
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B. The Mechanics of ITA 
As a matter of mechanics, when an investor asserts that a host 
state’s conduct violated a treaty’s substantive protections and 
damaged the investment, IIAs generally permit the affected investor 
to begin a formal dispute resolution.56 If the dispute is not otherwise 
resolved through negotiation or mediation,57 the investor requires the 
state to arbitrate in one of the predesignated forums to resolve the 
dispute.58 Thereafter, each party can select one arbitrator; then either 
an arbitral institution or the two co-arbitrators appoint a presiding 
arbitrator.59 After signing statements of independence and 
impartiality, arbitrators resolve investment disputes60 in accordance 
with the applicable law,61 which generally includes the substantive 
provisions of the IIA and other international law principles.62 Parties 
then gather facts and generate legal arguments for different phases of 
the dispute, namely jurisdiction, merits, quantum, and costs. If 
investors fail to establish jurisdictional prerequisites,63 the case 
 
 56. Much of the overview of ITA doctrine and arbitration mechanics derives from earlier 
summaries. See, e.g., Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 3–7.  
 57. In some cases, treaties require investors to initially sue the state within the state’s own 
courts for a period of time; and should a host state fail to act, investors can then initiate ITA. 
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 72 (2009).  
 58. While IIAs vary, investors generally elect to arbitrate before (1) an ad hoc tribunal 
using the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration 
Rules, (2) the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), or (3) the World Bank’s ICSID. There 
is some evidence that IIAs permit investors to arbitrate at the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, IIA Issues Note: 
Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Resolution, No. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/10 (Apr. 2012) (indicating only seven known ICC ITA cases); Jason W. 
Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) 
Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805 (2008). 
 59. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 57, 1355–56, 1387 
(2009); Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 21, at 1543–44. 
 60. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 124 
(1995). 
 61. Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
45, 52–53 (1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International 
Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 59, 65 (1995); Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting 
an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to Consider, 17 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Oct. 2002, 
at 2, 3. 
 62. Yas Banifatemi, Mapping the Future of Investment Treaty Arbitration as a System of 
Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 323, 323–24 (2009); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules 
of Law and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 175, 190–200 (2007). 
 63. Using the provisions established by the relevant treaty, investors must establish there is 
(1) a qualifying investor, (2) a qualifying investment that is (3) brought under an enforceable 
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terminates and the state is not liable. Otherwise, the dispute 
continues to the merits where the tribunal assesses if the state 
violated the treaty’s substantive protections by failing to provide the 
promised protection. If there is no breach, the case terminates and 
the state is not liable. Should there be jurisdiction and a breach on the 
merits, the parties establish the value of the treaty breach at the 
quantum phase. Cost awards, which allocate fiscal responsibility for 
lawyer and arbitrator fees, can be made at any point in the 
proceedings but typically occur at the end. Irrespective of whether 
tribunals issue multiple awards in a single case, the tribunal ultimately 
renders a final award that is enforceable worldwide under an 
international arbitration convention.64 
C. The Debate over ITA 
The popularity of ITA has ebbed and flowed over time. Initially, 
many gave ITA “overwhelming praise” for its “unmitigated” 
success.65 Supportive commentary came from international law 
luminaries including Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, who praised the 
benefits of ITA for capital-importing and exporting states.66 The 
extolment of these virtues may reflect a time of increasing investment 
flows, increasing volume of treaties, and few treaty disputes. During a 
period of global economic growth, the benefits seemed tangible and 
the risks appeared minimal.67 Voluntary compliance with adverse 
 
treaty within a proper time frame. Franck, Conflating, supra note 41, at 22–23. Any failure leads 
to a lack of jurisdiction, no substantive treaty protection, and no treaty-based state liability. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 1–2, 25, 29; LUCY REED, JAN 
PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 179–90 (2d ed. 2010). 
Generally enforcement occurs under either the ICSID Convention or the New York 
Convention, where there are opportunities for review of awards. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, 
supra note 21, at 1547–48, 1554–55. 
 65. David P. Riesenberg, Fee Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Policy 
Justifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L.J. 977, 985 (2011) (discussing the 
satisfaction and praise for the existing ITA system and citing Jeswald Salacuse, Stephen 
Schwebel, Thomas Wälde, Ian Laird and Joel Beauvais, who have championed ITA). 
 66. Kyriaki Karadelis, Schwebel Opens ICCA Miami with Defence of BITs, 9 GLOBAL 
ARB. REV. 25 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32554/schwebel-
opens-icca-miami-defence-bits [http://perma.cc/WFJ8-V62V]; Stephen M. Schwebel, The 
Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 
265–68 (2009).  
 67. Early North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cases might have been 
viewed as favorable when contrasted with prominent ICJ litigation. The United States, for 
instance, was unable to establish an expropriation claim on behalf of investors. Elettronica 
Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (July 20). By contrast, 
although the first treaty permitting ITA was signed in 1959, the first arbitration award was 
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arbitration awards was also preferable to decades of delay in public 
international law adjudication.68 Some continue to praise ITA, 
suggesting, “[s]tates and investors both stand to benefit from 
international arbitration.”69 
Recent commentary expresses discontent with ITA. The Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation refers to problematic “unpredictable” 
ITA outcomes.70 UNCTAD’s World Investment Report echoed these 
fears and highlighted concerns about “inconsistent readings of key 
provisions in IIAs and poor treaty interpretation, improving the 
impartiality and quality of arbitrators” and “assisting developing 
countries in handling [ITA] cases.”71 Others state cases “can reach 
into the billions” of dollars, citing one case that is a statistical outlier 
without providing a holistic context.72 Meanwhile commentators 
 
rendered roughly thirty years later. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITA/IIA/2 (2000), http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf [http://perma.cc/SSM9-H9KL] (describing the historical 
evolution of BITs from 1959 to 1999); Mann, supra note 9, at 523 (noting the first treaty was 
signed in 1959); Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 
Award, ¶ 18 (June 27, 1990), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita1034.pdf [http://perma.cc/SN5Q-45PB] (observing the first ITA award came in 1990). 
 68. In Metalclad, Mexico promptly paid U.S. investors after unsuccessfully challenging the 
award in a Canadian court. Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty 
Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 187 (2012). This contrasts with the nearly five 
decades needed to obtain full compliance with a damages award rendered at the ICJ. See 
Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court 
of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 825 n.56 (2007) (explaining that the Corfu Channel case 
settled 47 years after the original judgment). Compare Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 
1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (awarding the United Kingdom for damage to two ships in 1946), with 
David J. Bederman, Jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Albania 
Claims, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 271, 272 n.11 (2012) (noting that Albania paid the Corfu Channel 
ICJ judgment in October 1996). 
 69. Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact 
Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 196, 202 (2012); see also Blythe, supra note 44, at 287–88 
(discussing the benefits of ITA); Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 698, 701–03, 707–08, 
719–21, 758 (same). 
 70. Silvia Constain, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
PREVENTION STRATEGIES, at vii, 35 (June 2013), https://www.apec.org/~/media/Files/Groups/
IEG/20130625_IEG-DisputePrevention.pdf [http://perma.cc/7CTH-SGWM].  
 71. UNCTAD, WIR 2012, supra note 1, at 86–88; see also UNCTAD, WIR 2013, supra note 
1, at 110–17 (discussing the benefits of international arbitration). Others suggest ITA involves 
considerable time and costs, and that cases “run, on average, several years and entail large costs 
for both claimants and respondent States.” Kyla Tienhaara, Third-Party Participation in 
Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L 
ENVTL. L. 230, 240 (2007). 
 72. Note, supra note 11, at 2548–49. 
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suggest ITA is a “legal monster”73 that involves “[p]rofiting from 
[i]njustice” since “agreeing to arbitration [means] states have 
accepted to be sued by the devil in hell.”74 Against this backdrop, 
debates about ITA in South Korea, a country with over seventy IIAs 
and no adverse ITA awards at the time, spawned physical fights by 
parliamentarians in 2011.75 Academics issued a Public Statement 
claiming ITA is not a “fair, independent, and balanced method for 
the resolution of investment disputes and therefore should not be 
relied on for this purpose.”76 Others have stated that ITA should be 
abandoned to “reassert the integrity of our domestic legal 
processes.”77 In an effort to critique ITA, protestors have even 
performed a self-styled “exorcism” of lawyers practicing ITA.78 
Beyond concerns about unpredictable outcomes or 
inconsistency,79 some complain that ITA reflects a reliable pro-
 
 73. Mahnaz Malik, The Legal Monster That Lets Companies Sue Countries, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2011, 2:23 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/04/
bilateral-investment-treaties [http://perma.cc/Z85F-4PAZ]; see also EBERHARDT & OLIVET, 
supra note 22, at 10–11, 24, 73 (including references to ITA as a “monster”); George Monbiot, 
This Transatlantic Trade Deal is a Full-Frontal Assault on Democracy, THE GUARDIAN: 
COMMENT IS FREE (Nov. 4, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
nov/04/us-trade-deal-full-frontal-assault-on-democracy [http://perma.cc/WW69-U7MH] (stating 
ITA is a “monstrous assault”); Discover the Dark Side of Investment, TRANSNAT’L LAW INST. 
(June 27, 2012), https://www.tni.org/en/article/discover-dark-side-investment [http://perma.cc/
7VZ9-S3BQ] (providing video that offers a caricature of ITA). 
 74. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 22, at 11.  
 75. Associated Press, South Korea Passes U.S. Free-Trade Agreement, Lawmaker Sets Off 
Tear Gas Canister in Protest, FOX NEWS (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/
11/22/south-korea-passes-us-free-trade-agreement-lawmaker-sets-off-tear-gas-canister [http://
perma.cc/BRL8-LY3Z]; Alison Ross, Arbitration Clause Sparks Protests in Korea, 6 GLOBAL 
ARB. REV., Nov. 29, 2011, http://globalarbitrationreview.com/b/29995 [http://perma.cc/3V8P-
F2FF]. 
 76. Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime (Aug. 
31, 2010), http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-
august-2010 [http://perma.cc/DTA4-E37S]. The signatories stated there “is a strong moral as 
well as policy case for governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose 
investor-state arbitration, including by refusal to pay arbitration awards.” Id. 
 77. An Open Letter From Lawyers to the Negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Urging the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, TPP LEGAL (May 8, 2012,), https://tpp
legal.wordpress.com/open-letter [http://perma.cc/Q6X7-CAX6]. 
 78. Meredith Hobbs, Activists Perform ‘Exorcism’ on King & Spalding in London, DAILY 
REP. (May 4, 2015), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202725385488/Activists-Perform-
Exorcism-on-King-amp-Spalding-in-London?slreturn=20150615112520 [http://perma.cc/RH5S-
ECU3]; see also Global Justice Now, Reverend Billy Exorcises a Corporate Law Firm in 
London, YOUTUBE (May 3, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tAztBns9jg [http://
perma.cc/QVC9-SQSS] (providing video footage of the “exorcism”).  
 79. See Note, supra note 11, at 2548 (observing that ITA outcomes are “notoriously 
unpredictable” and parties cannot “predict the outcome or value the dispute”); Daniel S. 
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investor bias.80 Under this critique, while ITA outcomes may be 
predictable, they are influenced by spurious adjudication variables 
like arbitrator identity or arbitration venue. For example, some 
commentators suggest that arbitrators themselves are biased in favor 
of investors81 and otherwise posit that arbitrator identity is a critical 
component of outcomes.82 Likewise, commentators suggest the 
arbitration venue determines outcomes, and awards rendered at 
ICSID are biased.83 Rather than focusing on adjudicative variables, 
other commentators critique ITA by suggesting that outcomes may 
depend upon case-specific variables, such as the identity of the 
investor,84 the respondent,85 or their counsel.86 
 
Meyers, In Defense of the International Treaty Arbitration System, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 47, 78 
(2008) (discussing claims that ITA outcomes are “remarkable for . . . their lack of coherence”). 
But see Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the 
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 473, 487 (2009) (arguing 
that ITA outcomes are not as unpredictable as critics state). 
 80. See supra text accompanying note 21. But see Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 
710–11 (identifying but rejecting arguments related to pro-investor bias). 
 81. Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in WAIBEL ET AL., 
supra note 24, at 433–53; Van Harten, supra note 31, at 216–19. But see Maupin, supra note 40, 
at 386 (expressing reservations as to whether arbitrators are biased towards investors); Meyers, 
supra note 79, at 78 (disagreeing with claims of arbitrator’s pro-investor bias). 
 82. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, at 3 n.9, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/
2013/4 (June 2013), http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf [http://
perma.cc/S2YC-2NJV] (positing “outcomes can be explained” by the fact that “often they 
represent the differences in the views of individual arbitrators”); id. at 4, 9 n.43 (observing the 
focus on arbitrators means lawyers conduct “intensive research on each arbitrator candidate” 
and observing parties spend “significant resources . . . researching arbitrator profiles”); M. 
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 82 (3d ed. 2010) (arguing 
that arbitrators “often show a near-fundamentalist zeal for investment protection”); Kapeliuk, 
Games, supra note 32, at 272–79, 292–311 (focusing on panel effects on outcomes); Kapeliuk, 
Repeat Appointment, supra note 32, at 47, 50–54, 70–71, 74–90 (focusing on outcomes rendered 
by elite arbitrators); Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
388, 388–91, 399–401, 403–22 (2014) (identifying a network effect among ITA arbitrators but not 
analyzing outcomes); Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? 23, 32 (Dec. 13, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-
workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12 [http://perma.cc/3YK3-UM4W] (focusing on the 
political preferences and repeat appointments of arbitrators to predict ITA outcomes). 
 83. See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3 (describing claims by Venezuelan government 
officials that ICSID is a biased forum); Franck, ICSID, supra note 32 (exploring claims of bias at 
ICSID); Leon Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 611 (2012) 
[hereinafter Trakman, ICSID] (exploring claims of bias at ICSID). 
 84. See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra at 22, at 8 (arguing there is a pro-corporate bias in 
ITA as “prominent arbitrators . . . [n]early all share businesses’ belief in the paramount 
importance of protecting private profits”); Bijlmakers, supra note 50, at 263–64 (describing how 
businesses make arbitrator appointments); infra note 180. 
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Some states have voted with their feet. Russia has withdrawn 
from the Energy Charter Treaty after an investor established 
jurisdiction over disputes related to the dissolution of Yukos Oil, and 
a July 2014 award subjected Russia to over fifty billion in damages.87 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have withdrawn from the ICSID 
Convention.88 The President of Ecuador has rejected ICSID, claiming 
ICSID “signifies colonialism, slavery with respect to transnationals, 
with respect to Washington, with respect to the World Bank.”89 In 
October 2012, Ecuador’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Integration similarly called an ICSID award “unjust, illegal, 
illegitimate and absurd.”90 Other states have encouraged the 
 
 85. See Franck, Development, supra note 32, at 438–39 (gathering sources conveying 
concerns about disparate treatment of states in ITA); see also Brower & Blanchard, supra note 
3, at 710 (identifying concerns that ITA is “biased against the developing countries”); Trakman, 
ICSID, supra note 83, at 611 (noting the perception that institutionalized arbitration protects 
the interests of developed states). 
 86. See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time For a Legal Assistance Center 
for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 252 
(2007) (“[A] party’s lawyers’ level of expertise will likely be a decisive factor in the outcome of 
the dispute. The importance of having access to legal expertise is only magnified in a specialized 
area of the law like [ITA] with which most lawyers have little familiarity.”); Catherine Rogers, 
The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 358 (2007) 
(highlighting that some developing nations have gained expertise in investment arbitration and 
its potential impact); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations 
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–102 (1974) (discussing the impact of 
repeat players in domestic litigation). 
 87. See John Defterios, Yukos Win Delivers Blow to Russia’s Putin, CNN (July 28, 2014, 
10:33 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/28/business/analysis-defterios-yukos-rosneft [http://
perma.cc/E78Y-3GR5] (discussing the US$50 billion award); Alison Ross, Russia Withdraws 
from Energy Charter Treaty, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Aug. 7, 2009), http://globalarbitrationreview.
com/news/article/18495 [http://perma.cc/3ACC-FRXD] (discussing treaty withdrawal). Because 
the award was beyond the cutoff date of the dataset, it is not included in the statistical analyses 
contained in this Article.  
 88. Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for 
Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 239, 241–42 (2012); see also WAIBEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 216; 
Trakman, TPP, supra note 15, at 1–15, n.65.  
 89. Trakman, ICSID, supra note 83, at 604. 
 90. Ecuador Will Require Invalidation of Fault of the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Favor of Occidental. Minister: Ricardo Patiño, ECUADOR 
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y MOVILIDAD HUMANA (Oct. 10, 2012, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuador-will-require-invalidation-of-fault-of-the-international-
center-for-settlement-of-investment-disputes-icsid-in-favor-of-western-minister-ricardo-patino 
[http://perma.cc/W3VM-Z986]; see also Cancillería Ecuador, Ecuador Exigirá Nulidad de Fallo 
de CIADI a Favor de Occidental, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=aGP1i8-h0qM&feature=share&list=UUkww-pqCcJ8D4O_ewd_l4hw [http://perma.cc/3EJ8-
JZ5B] (presenting a Spanish language video of Ricardo Patiño). President Correa has also 
apparently called the international arbitrators involved in resolving one ITA dispute “pimps.” 
Letter from Theodore B. Olson, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Hon. Richard C. Wesley, 
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“reemergence of the ‘toothless’ investment treaty” which, like older 
treaties of Friendship Navigation and Commerce, provides 
substantive rights but no forum.91 Australia stated its intention to 
reject ITA in future IIAs because of efficiency concerns related to 
costs, fractious disputes, and treaties’ net value.92 
Not all states agree and instead have retained ITA. In April 
2012, after a contentious consultation process, the United States 
crafted a model IIA that provided for ITA.93 China also changed its 
approach to ITA by broadening the scope of arbitration to permit 
tribunals to assess both merits and damages.94 Canada, which has had 
its investors bring claims, and paid awards after losing cases as a 
respondent, changed its model IIA while retaining ITA.95 A trilateral 
investment treaty among China, Japan, and Korea likewise preserved 
ITA as a means of dispute settlement.96 Even Australia, after a 
 
Hon. Amalya L. Kearse & Hon. Barrington D. Parker, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit 9 (June 1, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw4316.pdf [http://perma.cc/9DKZ-667G]. 
 91. Riesenberg, supra note 65, at 980, 987; UNCTAD, WIR 2012, supra note 1, at 139–40; 
see also Trakman, ICSID, supra note 83, at 658 (noting that Friendship, Navigation, and 
Commerce treaties provided only diplomatic protection, rather than formal dispute settlement). 
 92. Trakman, ICSID, supra note 83, at 648–49 (discussing and quoting the Australian 
Productivity Commission); see also AUSTL. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GILLARD 
GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND 
PROSPERITY 14 (Apr. 2011), http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2011_Gillard%20Govt%20
Trade%20Policy%20Statement.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YQZ-2JMH]. But see Luke Nottage, Why 
No Investor-State Arbitration in the Australia-Japan FTA, EAST ASIA FORUM (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/09/why-no-investor-state-arbitration-in-the-australia-
japan-fta [http://perma.cc/FH2J-XNBQ] (stating Australia included ITA in a treaty with South 
Korea).  
 93. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm [http://perma.cc/XT6C-BSVD].  
 94. See generally NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE (2009) (discussing Chinese policy).  
 95. Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs), CAN. 
FOREIGN AFF., TRADE & DEV. (May 27, 2015), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/fipa-apie.aspx?lang=eng [http://perma.cc/
962U-BKYH]. Canada’s recent treaty with the European Union retained ITA. See supra note 2 
and accompanying text; see also Consolidated CETA Text, CAN. FOREIGN AFF., TRADE & DEV. 
(Sep. 26, 2014), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng [http://perma.cc/R3QT-WRZ9] (providing the 
text of the recent treaty). 
 96. AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR 
THE PROMOTION, FACILITATION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT, art. 15 (May 13, 2012), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf [http://perma.cc/XUX8-
SB5R]. 
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national election leading to a change in government, included ITA in 
a treaty recently negotiated with South Korea.97 Meanwhile, although 
recent commentary in the media reflects varying perspectives on 
ITA’s value,98 states continue to renegotiate investment treaties, and 
ITA appears to be a viable option in TPP99 and TTIP.100 
Ultimately, the policy debate about ITA is a live issue with 
critical international political and economic ramifications. The 
normative and institutional design of dispute settlement will benefit 
from information that scientifically identifies variables contributing to 
ITA outcomes. 
 
 97. Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement, AUSTL. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/kafta/official-documents/Pages/chapter-11-investment.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/AUE2-VYQK] (providing the text of the Korean-Australia investment 
agreement recently negotiated that provides for ITA in articles 11.15 to 11.28); see Australia 
Concludes FTA Negotiations with the Republic of Korea, AUSTL. MINISTER FOR TRADE & INV. 
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://trademinister.gov.au/releases/2013/ar_mr_131205.html [http://perma.cc/
VHP7-892P] (discussing the treaty). But see Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/
Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Korea-Australia_Free_Trade_Agreement [http://perma.
cc/TN5B-VUZ4] (indicating the treaty was pending before the Australian Parliament until 
August 29, 2014). 
 98. Compare Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone 
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-
the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-
11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [http://perma.cc/FXQ6-WQ9X] (“If a final TPP agreement 
includes Investor-State Dispute Settlement, the only winners will be multinational 
corporations.”), with Editorial, Don’t Buy the Trade Deal Alarmism, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-buy-the-trade-deal-alarmism/2015/03/11/
41575fee-c1d5-11e4-9271-610273846239_story.html [http://perma.cc/V4B9-WHBR] (“Critics 
trumpet ISDS horror stories, but upon closer inspection they generally turn out not to be so 
horrible.”). See also supra notes 16–18, 20.  
 99. TPP was signed on October 5, 2015, during the final revisions to this Article. See supra 
note 5. Before the TPP text was made public, the U.S. Trade Representative indicated ITA is 
part of TPP. U.S.T.R., THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: UPGRADING AND IMPROVING 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading-
and-Improving-Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Fact-Sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/P78A-FE
UB]. The full text of TPP is now available. See TPP Full Text, U.S.T.R., https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [http://perma.cc/L22W-
59DJ]. 
 100. EU Draft Text on ISDS Contains Similarities, Differences to U.S. Approach, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE, Apr. 12, 2013, at 22; see also supra notes 4–6, 15, 20 and accompanying text. But 
see supra note 25 (identifying that the EU may prefer the creation of a permanent court to 
resolve treaty disputes). 
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II.  THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This Article examines ITA cases empirically to better 
understand possible predictors of outcomes from arbitral tribunals. 
The objective is both to permit states negotiating treaties to formulate 
dispute resolution strategies and to aid parties in understanding the 
relative risk of ITA. Given debates about party identity, arbitrators, 
and outcomes, our analyses included independent variables for the 
background of investors, states, lawyers, arbitrators, and venue. This 
section therefore first clarifies the unit of analysis, identifies how the 
dataset was created, and describes the variables and models used to 
conduct analyses to predict outcomes. 
A. Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis was ITA awards that were publicly available 
as of January 1, 2012. This included all public awards involving the 
resolution of a treaty-based investment dispute, which necessarily 
included awards rendered in English, Spanish, and French. The 
method for gathering publicly available awards was the same 
methodology used in previous research.101 As there is no single agreed 
repository for ITA awards, the primary source of the public awards 
was Professor Andrew Newcombe’s website, ITAlaw.com. This was 
supplemented and checked against other resources including the 
UNCTAD website, the ICSID website, the ICSID Review, and other 
sources.102  
International arbitration, depending on the applicable 
international law, varies in the formal doctrinal definition of “award” 
and distinguishes among types of tribunal activity. Awards—namely 
elements of cases that resolve dispositive key legal issues—under the 
 
 101. See Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 16–21 (describing the 
methodology used in previous research on ITA).  
 102. The UNCTAD Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement cases is 
available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ISDS.aspx. ICSID awards are searchable at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx. ICSID cases are 
available in print form, including the AIG v. Kazakhstan case referenced on Prof. Newcombe’s 
website, ITAlaw.com, but only published in ICSID Reports. Likewise, SCC cases are accessible 
through its website, http://www.arbitration.sccinstitute.com/swedish-arbitration-portal, or the 
Stockholm International Arbitration Review. Public awards were cross-checked through 
subscription websites like the APPLETON-ISR database on Westlaw, the Oxford University 
Press website Investmentclaims.com, and the Investor-State Law Guide. NAFTAclaims.com was 
also checked for cases arising under NAFTA.  
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ICSID Convention,103 New York Convention,104 or the UNCITRAL 
Model Law105 have specific but slightly different legal meanings. 
As this research examined all ITA cases, it adopted a precise 
definition of “award.” Namely, an “award” was a tribunal decision 
creating a dispositive and binding determination on a substantive 
phase, namely decisions on (1) jurisdiction; (2) merits; (3) quantum of 
damages; (4) allocation of costs; or (5) settlement agreements or 
other orders indicating a dismissal or discontinuance.106 This means 
that decisions providing information on the dispute—including 
interim measures, decisions on confidentiality, place of arbitration, 
arbitrator challenges, tribunals’ interpretive decisions, ad hoc 
Annulment Committees and subsequent decisions by national 
courts—were not coded. Disputes with only a dispute notice or 
arbitration request were omitted.107 
Three selection effects limit the inferential value of the unit of 
analysis. First, the dataset is a time-bounded population of ITA 
disputes that were derived from public awards. It necessarily means 
that it is possible that the population has continued to evolve and the 
external validity of this research is arguably limited. For example, 
awards rendered after January 2012 have continued to add variance 
to the population. While replication is required, multiple elements of 
the research demonstrate that key elements of ITA been stable over 
time. Even with the temporal limitation, the analyses provide a 
baseline for future consideration. 
 
 103. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States art. 48, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention] (defining an award); see also ICSID Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings, Rules 41, 43–45 (ICSID Apr. 10, 2006) (providing rules for preliminary 
objections to jurisdiction and discontinuances). 
 104. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
 105. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, at arts. 17–17J, 30–33, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006), http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/22
LV-95C2] (defining interim measures as awards capable of enforcement and defining other 
enforceable awards). 
 106. For outcomes, only the final award was analyzed. The methodology was similar to 
research analyzing ICSID awards on jurisdiction, merits, settlements, or orders for 
discontinuances. See Kapeliuk, Games, supra note 32, at 302 (describing the methodology for 
studying ICSID disputes). 
 107. Cases with dispute notices or arbitration requests were omitted because the limited 
information prevented reliable coding of outcomes. 
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Second, private awards could differ meaningfully from public 
awards, thereby limiting the value of inferences. The dataset reflects 
that, of the small subset of initially confidential cases in 2006, many 
have entered the public domain.108 Case selection bias may be limited, 
however. Irrespective of whether investors or states are successful, 
both types of parties have incentives to disclose awards. Investors, for 
example, may disclose awards because shareholders may positively 
view information that the investor has won a claim and created 
greater commercial certainty. Likewise, states may believe that 
notifying the public that they have won a case may restore confidence 
in the government or have another political use. 
Third, other investment-related conflicts were not coded. These 
types of conflicts either relate to formalized investment treaty 
disputes or conflicts that never crystalized into formal disputes.109 As 
Professor Reisman explains, given the “very large” scope of 
international investment, the 80,000 multinational enterprises and 
their 100,000 affiliates, and the possibility of claims under 3,000 
treaties, “then the number of actual disputes going to arbitration 
seems to be a miniscule fraction of the universe” of investment and 
investment conflict.110 This necessarily means that—by focusing on 
public arbitration awards—the research omits larger questions of 
 
 108. There did not appear to be any meaningful difference between awards that were 
initially private but became public and those that were historically public, and there was rough 
parity in the identity of parties, arbitrators and outcomes.  
 109. Two categories of formalized disputes were not analyzed. First, ITA disputes with a 
dispute notice—like those listed on the ICSID website—were in progress but there was 
unreliable public information. Even listing a case at ICSID does not guarantee the case involves 
ITA, as ICSID also has jurisdiction over domestic contract law or domestic investment law 
disputes. Second, there could be latent, non-formalized investment disputes. Investment-related 
problems arise every day. We are unaware of datasets measuring the latent scope of investment 
treaty conflict. States may implement programs to prevent or minimize conflicts leading to 
formal dispute notices; or parties may use alternative dispute resolution strategies to address 
conflicts prior to an investor submitting a formal dispute notice. Client counseling and cost-
benefit assessments may also impact dispute settlement as (1) an investor might abandon its 
claim or seek alternative commercial redress or (2) a state may address a disputed measure or 
otherwise redress state activity. See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (2011), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3EBA-7ETZ] (exploring the ISDS system holistically, existing processes of 
addressing treaty conflict, and alternative means for ISDS). The full range of unreported and 
informal disputes is likely larger but unknowable.  
 110. W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best 
Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J. 185, 186 (2009). 
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investment conflict.111 Narrowing the field of inquiry generates 
contained analysis based on available information. 
B. Generation of the Dataset 
The current dataset grew from earlier research (Generation 1 or 
G1 research). The five additional years of data expanded the number 
of publicly available awards by approximately 250% and increased 
the number of cases by 300%.112 Multiple coders coded raw data from 
awards with an initial 94.7% rate of intercoder agreement; and all 
divergences were later resolved. 
C. Variables Analyzed and Modeling 
Part III provides descriptive analyses exploring both the starting 
point and the final result of ITA. First, we descriptively examined 
amounts claimed, which measures the amount of damages claimed by 
investors in a common currency of U.S. dollars113 adjusted for 
inflation.114 
Defining a “win” in ITA is complex, as subjective definitions of a 
“win” create confusion, inject variance, and impede consistent 
 
 111. International trade research has analyzed World Trade Organization settlements that 
involve “negotiations in the ‘shadow of the law.’” Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing 
Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, 720 (2003). Future research might usefully explore these 
aspects of investment treaty conflict. Research offering information about how the legal shadow 
of ITA operates—either reliably or randomly—offers a baseline for understanding how, when 
and why pre-arbitration negotiations may be effective.  
 112. Coding occurred in three time periods. G1 data was collected from the beginning of 
ITA until June 1, 2006. Generation 2 (G2) data was collected from public awards between June 
1, 2006 and June 1, 2009. Generation 3 (G3) data was collected from awards in the public 
domain between June 1, 2009 and January 1, 2012. Cases unavailable before January 2012 were 
not coded. G2 and G3 data collection identified awards that, although once private, became 
public. All coders received extensive coding training for approximately four weeks prior to 
coding raw data. 
 113. Values were recorded in original U.S. Dollar amounts. If the original currency was not 
in U.S. Dollars, the currency was converted into U.S. Dollars as at the date of the award. When 
possible, the currency conversion was based upon figures from the FX Converter available at 
http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic using the interbank rate. 
 114. Adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by the 
Minneapolis U.S. Federal Reserve, using the website originally located at http://www.
minneapolisfed.org, which now appears to be located at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
community/teaching-aids/cpi-calculator-information/consumer-price-index-and-inflation-rates-
1913 [http://perma.cc/FTZ3-YYZ4]. The date of the award and January 1, 2011 were used for 
the conversion to adjust for inflation using US$ values in 2011.  
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measurement across cases.115 This research therefore used three 
different, objective, fiscally derived variables. Using a final award’s 
dispositif, which identifies the award’s core decisions, the research 
assessed when tribunals identified a compensable treaty breach or 
derivative damages. A first measure of outcome was operationalized 
using a binary categorical variable. Results were classified according 
to whether (1) the tribunal awarded an investor at least US$1, namely 
an “investor win,”116 or (2) the tribunal failed to award an investor 
damages (i.e. an award of US$0), namely a “respondent win.” A 
second measure assessed amounts awarded using a continuous 
measure of the fiscal amount a respondent was obligated to pay an 
investor in inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars.117 This second measure 
included awards reflecting settlements or discontinuances. A third 
measure examined investors’ relative success rate, or the percentage 
awarded to investors relative to their asserted claim; higher values 
reflect higher levels of relative investor success.118 
To explore a multiple regression approach for analyzing ITA 
outcomes for amounts awarded and relative investor success, Part IV 
 
 115. Some investors obtaining ITA compensation nevertheless subjectively viewed the 
outcome as a “loss.” See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in 
Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 7, 8–9 & n.3 
(2005) (referring to remarks by Grant Kesler, former CEO of Metalclad who successfully 
recovered over US$16 million from Mexico). Others suggest, even if a state is not liable, the 
mere existence of a dispute is a “loss.” See SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, 
CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE WORLD BANK’S INVESTMENT 
COURT, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HAVE 
UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF CORPORATE POWER AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, at ix, 4 (2007) 
(describing how Argentina settled an ITA dispute with an investor); Nathalie Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and Host States 
on a Level Playing Field?, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 69, 69 (2005) (arguing that the host State 
never wins because it has no rights, only obligations and cannot bring claims). Still others 
suggest settlement is a “loss”—even where parties agree on the outcome—because settlement 
involves some deviation from an original position). See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 22, 
at 9, 13, 22, 30, 58. 
 116. ATA Construction v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award (May 18, 2010), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0043.pdf [http://perma.cc/94DK-VFV2], 
was the only case where the tribunal awarded specific performance in lieu of damages; this was 
coded as an investor win as specific performance was a substitute for damages. 
 117. As arbitration costs and interest were coded separately, this variable only pertained to 
fiscal liability for treaty breach. 
 118. But see Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule 
of Law or Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1147, 1157–58 (2015) (identifying that defining “wins” in ITA has limitations, using one variable 
to identify an investor “win” when there was some measure of damage awarded and also 
measuring a state “win” when investors were awarded less than 25% of claimed damage). 
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includes analyses examining two different theories of arbitration 
outcomes: whether (1) case-related or (2) arbitrator-and-venue-
related factors contributed to outcomes. For the case-based 
paradigm,119 variables reflected investor identity, respondent identity, 
and experience of parties’ legal counsel. For the arbitrator-venue 
based paradigm,120 variables included panels’ gender composition,121 
panel’s composite-development status, whether the chair was a repeat 
player with multiple appointments, and venue. Although our analyses 
were primarily concerned with extralegal factors,122 the claim’s legal 
merits or other variables could contribute to outcomes.123 The 
challenge in ITA is that the absence of de jure precedent or an 
appellate body creating legal coherence makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify legally correct outcomes ex ante. Given these 
constraints, “it is impossible to control for the most essential 
variable,” namely, “the ‘correct’ legal outcome in a particular case.”124 
Rather than abandon efforts to offer empirical insights, we prefer to 
acknowledge the difficulty. We also identify the constraints as a 
reason to prefer models analyzing relative investor success, as that 
variable uses a common scale to evaluate all cases and offers some 
 
 119. See supra notes 38–39, 84–86 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 121. We are unaware of published literature suggesting gender affects ITA outcomes. But 
see Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 34–35, 37 (providing unpublished analysis suggesting women 
decide some ITA issues differently). In other contexts, adjudicator gender influences outcome. 
See Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in 
the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761, 1776–79 (2005) (identifying the presence 
of at least one female judge on panels reviewing sexual harassment and discrimination cases 
affects outcome). There are concerns about the lack of women in ITA. Franck, Empirically 
Evaluating, supra note 32, at 81–83 (noting less than 10% of ITA arbitrators are women); Susan 
D. Franck, James Freda, Kellen Lavin, Tobias A. Lehmann & Anne van Aaken, The Diversity 
Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L., 429, 434, 451–55, 467–69, 480–82, 489–90, 492–93 (2015) (identifying gender 
diversity concerns in international arbitration). We thus believed it prudent to explore whether 
gender influenced outcomes. 
 122. Jury research often examines extra legal factors and impact on outcomes. Brian H. 
Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-legal Factors and Product Liability: The Influence of Mock 
Jurors’ Demographic Characteristics and Intuitions about the Cause of Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & 
L. 127, 127 (1994); John Hagan, Extra-legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment 
of a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 357, 362 (1973). 
 123. See infra notes 179, 194, 233–35 and accompanying text (discussing other potential 
variables, noting cases with energy disputes did not reliably predict outcome, and identifying 
derivative limitations).  
 124. Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 223, 234 (2013); see also infra note 194 (discussing difficulty of identifying 
legal correctness). 
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control for the merits by creating a uniform measure reflecting 
amounts in dispute.125 
III.  DESCRIPTIVE ARBITRATION OUTCOMES 
Given the relatively limited information on ITA, some of the 
most interesting questions relate to basic descriptive outcomes. 
Knowing the mean and median ITA outcomes helps develop a 
general portrait of how ITA operates overall. While treaties do not 
necessarily permit national courts to resolve investment treaty 
disputes against states, it may aid future comparisons with national 
court litigation126 and arbitration.127 This section therefore explores 
descriptive questions related to amounts claimed, binary outcomes 
(that is, whether an investor won or lost), and relative outcomes, 
including a focus on both amounts claimed and relative investor 
success. 
A. Amounts Claimed 
Although a nascent literature exists,128 there has been a dearth of 
scientific analysis of potential fiscal exposure in ITA. Without 
systematic analysis, some suggest that “several pending cases involve 
claims for billions of dollars,”129 while others contend “[c]laims for 
several hundred million pounds are by no means unusual.”130 The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
 
 125. See Rogers, supra note 124, at 234 (arguing “the relative strength of a particular party’s 
case” serves as a control for correct outcomes). 
 126. U.S. litigation outcomes have been studied empirically. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429–30 (2004); Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The 
Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical 
Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1459–60 (2003); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, 
Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful 
Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 511, 513–14 (2003). As the applicable law in U.S. courts likely involved domestic law, 
rather than international law, inferences are limited. 
 127. See Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case 
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2011). 
 128. See supra notes 31–32 (identifying the existing literature). 
 129. Simmons, supra note 69, at 196. 
 130. Christoph Schreuer, Investment Arbitration: A Voyage of Discovery, 71 ARBITRATION 
73, 73 (2005); see also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An 
Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1400 
(2003) (observing investors “alleged extensive damages” and referring to two cases). 
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similarly stated that ITA “cases frequently involve huge claims.”131 
Still others suggest the economic stakes of ITA have “skyrocketed” 
and warn, “‘[b]ringing a billion-dollar claim is no longer enough to 
stand out.’”132 The key question is whether the commentary 
withstands systematic inquiry. 
Out of the 202 cases coded, 117 contained either partial or full 
quantification of investors’ claimed damage. For cases with multiple 
awards articulating amounts claimed, the most recent award with a 
fully particularized amount claimed was coded.133 Amounts were 
converted to a common currency (U.S. dollars) and adjusted for 
inflation. 
The mean inflation-adjusted amount claimed was 
US$622,633,418 and the median was US$100,426,693 (n=117; 
SD=2331828846). The lowest amount claimed was US$41,620.60 
(MDL 525,834.58) in Yury Bogdanov v. Moldova,134 and the highest 
amount claimed was US$19 billion in Saba Fakes v. Turkey.135 These 
large mean claims were nearly twice the size of earlier research where 
the mean claims were US$340–370 million (median of roughly US$60 
million).136 The eight largest cases, with inflation-adjusted claims 
exceeding US$1 billion, skewed the mean. Excluding these eight 
outliers, the mean amount claimed was US$158,938,054 (median 
US$86,277,549; n=109; SD=182183541). Amounts claimed in the 
lowest quartile were under US$23.7 million, the second lowest 
quartile ranged from US$23.7 to US$86.3 million, the second highest 
 
 131. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
PUBLIC CONSULTATION: 16 May – 9 July 2012, at 62 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/
internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642.pdf [http://perma.cc/M8WG-L8VU]. 
 132. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 22, at 14; see also Michael D. Goldhaber, 
Arbitration Scorecard 2011: The Biggest Cases You Never Heard Of, AM. LAW. DAILY (July 6, 
2011, 6:00 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/07/arbscorecard2011.html 
[http://perma.cc/4X37-96FS] (“Nor is it enough to win a measly $100 million . . . . What it takes 
to distinguish yourself these days is a $350 million award, minimum.”). 
 133. We chose this time period as we anticipated that later values in time more accurately 
reflected the amount at risk. Although sometimes claims decreased, other times, claims 
increased.  
 134. Yury Bogdanov v. Moldova, Arb. No. V 114/2009, Final Arbitral Award, at 22 
(Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0096.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9AF-SDAR]. 
 135. Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, at 3 (July 14, 2010), http://
www.italaw.com/documents/Fakes_v_Turkey_Award.pdf [http://perma.cc/WJ22-8WPM].  
 136. Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 57–59; see also Susan D. Franck, The 
Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment by José E. Alvarez, 106 
AM. J. INT’L L. 890, 894–95 (2012) (book review) [hereinafter Franck, Alvarez Review] 
(discussing earlier research). 
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quartile ranged from US$86.3 to US$237.8 million, and the highest 
quartile contained claims over US$237.8 million. 
The results suggest that ITA involved nontrivial fiscal risk. The 
data did not indicate that it takes a billion-dollar claim “to stand out.” 
Rather, as the caseload increased, the number of both small and large 
claims increased. Nevertheless, facial trends suggest potential 
increases in amounts claimed, which warrants ongoing assessment. In 
the interim, investors may discover that bringing a billion-dollar claim 
could generate infamy rather than remuneration. The data reflected 
that, for the eight largest claims, only one case was successful; and the 
vast majority of investors bringing billion-dollar claims obtained 
nothing.137 In those circumstances, states may be skeptical about the 
ultimate value of one billion-dollar claims, and investors may wish to 
take care to carefully substantiate their claims. 
B. Binary Win Rates 
Potential risk, however, is not realized risk. One of the most 
basic questions in arbitration, particularly ITA, is who wins. Earlier 
research, limited to pre-2007 data analyzing fifty final awards 
(excluding settlements and discontinuances), indicated that investors 
won 40% of the cases and respondents won 60%.138 Jose Alvarez 
wrote, these “numbers pour cold water on unexamined assertions by 
many critics of the [ITA] regime” that ITA exhibits a pro-investor 
bias.139 The original historical snapshot analyzed fewer than sixty final 
awards, and the results could have changed over time. 
Backed by a nearly 300% increase in cases analyzed, the current 
research replicated the proportions identified in earlier research. For 
 
 137. See Libananco Holdings Co. v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Award (Sep. 2, 
2011); Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20; Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v. 
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award (Sep. 17, 2009); Europe Cement v. Turkey, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (Aug. 13, 2009); Occidental v. Ecuador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Jurisdiction (Sep. 9, 2008); Generation Ukr. v. Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/9, Award (Sep. 16, 2003); Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA, Final 
Award (Aug. 3, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005). The only exception was Total S.A. v. Argentina, 
where the amount in controversy was over US$1.2 billion, and after a finding of state liability, 
an unpublished quantum award in 2013 awarded the investor damages. Total S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 31, 485 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0868.pdf [http://perma.cc/4MWE-W5P4]; 
Total S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, ITALAW, http://www.italaw.
com/cases/1105 [http://perma.cc/929G-QS4M] (noting that the arbitration award is not public). 
 138. Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 49–50, 58 n.254 (2007). This excluded 
two cases involving settlements. Id. 
 139. ALVAREZ, supra note 42, at 391. 
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the 144 awards finally resolving treaty disputes,140 fifty-seven cases 
(39.6%) were investor wins. By contrast, there were eighty-seven 
cases (60.4%) where respondents won with no state liability. See 
Figure 1. Chi-square analyses comparing the expected frequencies to 
obtained frequencies demonstrated a statistical difference (χ2(1)=6.25; 
p<.05). Cohen’s conventions,141 the difference exhibited a small-to-
medium effect (r=.21). The rough pattern was that, for every two 
cases where investors won, states won three cases.142 
Figure 1. Percentage of ultimate winners and losers in ITA (n=144) 
 
 
 140. These figures exclude settlements or discontinuances. Of those fifteen cases, eight were 
awards embodied by settlement agreements, three discontinuances involved investors 
abandoning claims, three discontinuances involved respondents paying investors damages, and 
one discontinuance involved a respondent paying nothing to settle the claim.  
 141. According to Cohen, effect sizes (r) up to .10 are “small,” .11 to .30 are “medium,” and 
.31 to .50 are “large.” JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES 79–80 (2d ed. 1988). 
 142. This is roughly analogous to recently published research. Daniel Behn, Legitimacy, 
Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the State-of-the-
Art, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 370–72 (2015) (analyzing decisions between 2011–14 to ascertain 
that states won roughly 60% of cases and specifically stating “twenty-five awards declining 
jurisdiction (33%), eighteen awards dismissing on the merits (24%), and thirty-four awards 
upholding claims on the merits (43%)”); Schultz & Dupont, supra note 118, at 15–17 
(identifying that, using a dataset of investor-state awards that included non-ITA cases, investors 
won 46% of cases as compared with states by observing “investors have in fact won fewer cases 
(eighty-seven in the 1972–2010 period) than host states (102 in the same period)”). Three 
independent groups of researchers—analyzing somewhat similar datasets but with different 
temporal periods, different scopes of ITA-related cases, and different measures—identified 
similar outcome patterns, which lends credibility to the hypothesis that a “pro-investor bias” in 
ITA outcomes is empirically unverifiable as a population parameter. 
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This excludes cases involving settlements or discontinuances and 
categorizes ultimate outcomes by (1) cases where the tribunal 
awarded any damages (more than US$0) or an equivalent remedy; (2) 
cases where tribunal rendered an award in the state’s favor with US$0 
liability. 
The stability in proportionate outcomes over time was 
noteworthy. Both governments and investors were successful in ITA, 
although states won in slightly larger proportions. This stability and 
replication suggests earlier historical research was robust. 
Those results have implications. First, the results suggest that 
claims of a pro-investor bias are overstated or, at least, inaccurate in 
the context of final outcomes. If such a bias existed, the data should 
have revealed that investors won more than states. Instead, the results 
were reversed and states won slightly more. Unlike the antidefendant 
bias facially observable in the International Trade Commission’s 
treatment of patent cases143 or Clermont and Eisenberg’s research 
suggesting foreign plaintiffs experienced high win rates in U.S. 
courts,144 ITA did not exhibit an antirespondent bias. Rather, overall 
results tended to favor respondents. This is similar to UNCTAD’s 
research finding that states won proportionately more cases than 
investors.145 
 
 143. See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at 
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 63–64 (2008) (identifying that 
in ITC claims, plaintiffs won 58% of cases as compared to 35% in U.S. District Court); Robert 
W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of 
International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457, 462 (2008) (reporting 
“[b]etween 1975 and 1988, the complainant prevailed . . . in 65% of patent cases brought to the 
ITC, compared with a 40% to 45% win rate for patent plaintiffs in federal district courts,” and 
more recently “the ITC has decided 54 percent of contested cases in favor of the patent 
holder”). But see MARK A. LEMLEY, THE FRACTIONING OF PATENT LAW, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 504, 506 n.14 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (arguing 
the Priest-Klein model does not apply to patent litigation as “every empirical study of patent 
law . . . shows systematic variation from a 50% win rate”). 
 144. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1120, 1127–30 (1996) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia] (identifying 
foreign plaintiffs won between 67–83% of the cases brought in U.S. courts between 1986 and 
1994); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts? 
Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 456–59 (2007) [hereinafter Clermont 
& Eisenberg, After 9/11] (suggesting earlier research reflected a case selection effect, arguing 
globalization decreased the reluctance of foreigners to litigate in U.S. courts and stating “more 
standard win rates are now reasserting themselves” as foreigners were more likely to bring less 
meritorious cases).  
 145. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 
2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies, 
at 126, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2014 (June 23, 2014), http://unctad.org/en/Publications
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Second, for states considering whether to include arbitration in 
treaties, the data suggest that ITA did not disfavor states. This is 
perhaps unsurprising, as Eisenberg and Farber identified that 
claimants tended to win at lower rates when suing states.146 As the 
similarity suggests that states may have a natural advantage when 
they create and participate in dispute resolution, whether in a 
national or international context, states may wish to explore whether 
arbitration is a viable dispute resolution option. For investors, 
although they may wish to carefully assess whether to initiate claims, 
the data suggest investors sometimes won. 
Third, the results suggest that the Priest-Klein model of 
litigation, which predicts plaintiffs generally win 50% of cases 
irrespective of the applicable legal standards,147 may not apply to ITA. 
The Priest-Klein model is derived from U.S. court litigation and is 
based on assumptions including the application of U.S. domestic law, 
clear and available precedent, and only “close” cases going to trial. 
By contrast, treaties do not necessarily permit national courts to 
resolve treaty disputes,148 ITA precedent is not always available,149 and 
 
Library/wir2014_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/HN3D-BXTC] (“Of [274 known completed cases], 
approximately 43 per cent were decided in favour of the State and 31 per cent in favour of the 
investor. Approximately 26 per cent of cases were settled.”); see also supra note 142 (identifying 
similar findings of state-dominant success in new research).  
 146. See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and 
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1569 (1989) (offering quantitative “evidence that litigating 
against the government leads to lower than normal success at trial”); Theodore Eisenberg & 
Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model, 9 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 94, 96 (2003) (“[T]he plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases with the 
government as defendant is lower than the plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases with 
private defendants.”); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort 
Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 719, 750–52 (1988) (explaining that plaintiffs in constitutional torts cases may 
bring weaker cases to trial because they are not repeat players). 
 147. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (1984); Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection 
of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 
313, 314 (1988). 
 148. This could, for example, derive from concerns about whether state courts resolving 
disputes against the states would intentionally or unintentionally exhibit a self-serving bias. It 
may also implicate (rightly or wrongly) perceived capacity to provide impartial justice. There 
may also be concerns related to capacity to resolve complex international law disputes.  
 149. While there is a wealth of publicly available precedent, not all cases are public and they 
may have only de facto rather than de jure effect. See, e.g., Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L 
ARB. 129 (2007) (discussing precedent and empirically analyzing citations in ITA awards); 
Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do 
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 2 U.C. DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 68–69 (2005) 
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the application of precedent can be unclear.150 This suggests the 
Priest-Klein model may not be an appropriate baseline for evaluating 
the sui generis dispute settlement of international investment law. 
Rather, ITA appears akin to other types of adjudication where 
the process favors respondents generally or states in particular. In 
those cases, the 50/50 baseline was inapposite where there were large 
amounts in dispute, gaps in access to information, or where 
settlement costs were high relative to litigation costs.151 Given high 
claims, high arbitration costs,152 and information asymmetries,153 ITA 
seems akin to adjudication where parties should expect respondents 
to have a relative advantage.154 A better analogy for ITA might 
therefore be success rates in whistleblower lawsuits,155 qui tam 
 
(describing aspects of de jure and de facto precedent in ITA); Nick Gallus, Protection of Non-
Governmental Organizations in Egypt Under the Egypt-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, 14 
INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 62, 67 (2012) (“[D]ecisions are certainly not always consistent and 
a decision on the interpretation of a provision is far from a guarantee that a similar provision, or 
even the same provision, will be interpreted the same way by another tribunal.”); see also Raj 
Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three 
Of A Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 950 (2001) (discussing lack of de jure 
precedent in WTO litigation). 
 150. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 21, at 1522. 
 151. Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the 
Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 233, 242–46 (1996); see also Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New 
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 352 (1990) (noting repeat 
players having greater access to information altered success rates); Keith N. Hylton, 
Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 33, 48 (2006) 
(discussing the impact of informational asymmetries on litigation). 
 152. See Franck, Mediation, supra note 27, at 77–78 (providing mean data that the average 
cost for lawyer fees in ITA for each party was US$5 million and the mean tribunal cost was 
approximately US$1 million).  
 153. Developing countries may lack access to specialized counsel with inside information 
related to the law of ITA or arbitration strategy. See Gottwald, supra note 86, at 250–51. Small 
investors who are not repeat players may experience similar information gaps.  
 154. But see Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 423–24 (2010) 
(discussing a high detainee win rate in a small number of litigated habeas cases involving 
Guantanamo detainees). 
 155. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 
64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2012) (identifying that less than 10% of employee whistleblowing 
claims before administrative agencies under Sarbanes-Oxley were successful); Richard E. 
Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 67 (2007) (same); Nancy M. Modesitt, 
Why Whistleblowers Lose: An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis of State Court Cases, 62 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 165, 180–82 (2013) (identifying a 24% win rate for whistleblowers in a sample of 
34 cases). 
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litigation,156 Bivens lawsuits against government officials for violations 
of citizens’ U.S. constitutional rights,157 citizen complaints against 
agency action,158 civil- or prisoner-rights cases,159 or medical-
malpractice litigation.160 These cases share other similarities with ITA, 
as they involve claims by individuals, claims against a state, claims 
related to improper regulatory activity, or claims seeking fiscal 
compensation. 
C. Amounts Awarded and Relative Investor Success 
As a binary metric masks nuance, ITA outcomes should also be 
assessed using more sensitive measures. When considering amounts 
awarded or relative investor success, investors experienced some 
success, but states obtained relatively more success. 
Including settlements, there were 159 cases where ITA tribunals 
made awards that resulted in a damage determination. There were 
101 cases where investors were awarded nothing at the conclusion of 
the dispute, whether by virtue of a tribunal damage award, settlement 
agreement or discontinuance.161 For the remaining 58 cases, awards 
reflected a damage award or respondent’s agreement to pay damages 
 
 156. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from 
Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1288–90, 1296, 1299, 1306, 1319–20 (2012) 
(observing an overall win rate of approximately 28% and identifying that critical variables 
affecting outcomes involved the experience of lawyers). 
 157. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences 
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 827–30, 839–46 (2010) (observing that 
30% of Bivens claims succeeded through settlement or merits disposition, disproving assertions 
that those claims typically lack merit and burden the federal judiciary, and arguing that 
normative approaches based upon faulty empirical assessments are improper).  
 158. See Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 249 (2012) (identifying that citizen petitions to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration to take action on drug safety were successful only 19% of the time); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1084, 1099 (2008) 
(identifying agency win-rates were generally over 70%). 
 159. See Eisenberg, supra note 146, at 1578–80 (identifying success rates of civil rights, 
employment discrimination, and prisoner civil-rights litigation cases were far below reported 
trial success rates for other litigation and typically below 50%). 
 160. See Thomas H. Cohen, Tort Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF 
JUST. STAT. BULL., at 4 (Nov. 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf [http://
perma.cc/W5B8-LVX5] (finding plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases had a win rate of less 
than 25% in tort trials and jury trials); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice 
Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1126 (2006) 
(finding medical malpractice plaintiffs lost 70% or more cases and questioning applicability of 
the Priest-Klein model in medical malpractice). 
 161. This included discontinuances and settlements that did not create fiscal liability. 
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through settlement and/or discontinuance.162 Put simply, even 
including known settlements, investors obtained damages in less than 
half the cases. 
For all cases, investors obtained a mean award of US$16.6 
million and a median award of US$0. Investors’ relative success in 
final cases reflected a mean success rate of 18%, but a median 2% 
success rate. See Table 1. Both measures of central tendency 
demonstrate that investors obtained awards of 2–18¢ for each dollar 
claimed. The results may reflect large standard deviations, outliers, 
and variation in the ITA caseload. 
Focusing on the subset cases where investors obtained an award 
minimizes variance. Table 1 reflects the mean amount awarded was 
US$45.6 million and the median was US$10.9 million. The amount 
claimed for cases involving claimant success was not as extreme as the 
overall sample, and the mean amounts claimed decreased by 
approximately one-third.163 As tribunals weeded out unmeritorious or 
inflated claims, investors obtaining damage awards fared better. 
Relative to their requests, Table 1 reflects that successful investors 
obtained a mean of 35% and a median of 27% of requested damages. 
For the roughly 40% of investors obtaining damages, they secured 
roughly 30% of their claimed damage. 
Table 1: Outcomes as a Function of Inflation-Adjusted Amounts 
Awarded (in U.S. Dollars) and Relative Investor Success Comparing 
Amounts Claimed to Amounts Awarded 
Outcome Variable Mean Median SD n 
Amount Awarded  
(All Cases) 
16,623,986 0 16623986 159 
 
 
Relative Investor Success  
(All Cases) 
18.00% 1.86% 26.04 103 
 
 
Amount Awarded – Subset of Inves-
tor Wins 
45,572,651 10,866,790 68283499 58 
 
 
Relative Investor Success – Subset of 
Investor Wins 
 
34.98% 28.69% 26.92 53 
 
 162. Only two cases created a settlement or discontinuance requiring a payment: Goetz v. 
Burundi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award (Feb. 10, 1999) (reflecting agreement to pay 
US$2,989,636), and Impregilo v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Order of Discontinuance 
of the Proceeding (Sept. 25, 2005) (reflecting agreement to pay US$98,000,000).  
 163. For the subset, investors claimed an average amount of US$171,326,467 and a median 
amount of US$87,156,098 (n=53; SD=191861066). 
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The results are facially disparate from amounts awarded, for 
example, in employment arbitration164 or medical malpractice 
litigation,165 where claimants were generally awarded less than one 
million dollars on average. Those results may reflect the relative 
value of claims involving individuals applying established legal 
principles rather than multinational investments operating under 
complex regulatory regimes in multiple languages with unsettled legal 
principles. 
A better analogy for understanding outcomes in ITA involves 
amounts awarded and relative success of foreign claimants litigating 
in domestic courts. One might posit that domestic courts privilege 
domestic entities and penalize foreigners; and thus, ITA provides an 
alternative to promote the neutral application of legal principles. At 
least historically, however, foreigners were not disenfranchised by 
litigating in U.S. courts. Initially, Clermont and Eisenberg identified 
that foreigners suing domestic entities in U.S. courts did well; and for 
those cases, the median award exceeded the median demand.166 This 
was not the pattern for ITA outcomes. Rather, outcomes were 
facially akin to those of U.S. plaintiffs suing foreign defendants in 
U.S. courts. In those cases, domestic entities typically recovered half 
 
 164. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 127, at 5, 7 (identifying mean award of US$109,858 and 
median damages of US$36,500); Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?, 58 DISP. 
RESOL. J. 44, 57 (2003) (finding a mean damage award of US$236,292 and a median award of 
US$100,000); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment 
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 50 (2003) (finding mean damages of 
US$211,720 and US$32,500 for arbitration disputes brought by high paid employees for 
noncivil-rights and civil-rights claims, and median damages of US$98,984 and US$32,500); 
Oppenheimer, supra note 126, at 438–39 (2005) (identifying a median damage award of 
US$296,991). 
 165. Hyman & Silver, supra note 160, at 1110 (stating mean medical malpractice payments 
were approximately US$300,000 and, while the number of US$1 million claims increased, mean 
payment sizes over US$1 million did not increase over time); Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. 
Seabury, The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 356, 
369 (2012) (indicating average verdicts for non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases 
was US$142,000 and US$328,000 for economic damages); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended 
Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 451–52 (2005) 
(identifying, over time, that medical malpractice awards averaged from roughly US$250,000–
530,000 and plaintiff success rates ranged roughly from 23–27%). 
 166. See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 144, at 1141–42 (identifying that the 
median demand was US$73,155 but the median award was US$1,061,064 for foreigners suing 
domestic entities, and also identifying that the mean demand was US$913,198 and the mean 
award was US$1,061,064). 
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of their demand,167 as “cases against foreigners are characterized by 
big demands, but not big awards. This pattern suggests a blustering 
plaintiff with a lower chance of winning.”168 In any event, foreign 
plaintiffs’ success in U.S. courts has changed over time. As 
globalization decreased concerns of xenophobia, Clermont and 
Eisenberg’s post-9/11 research indicates that, more recently, 
foreigners have brought marginally weaker cases and their success 
levels have also decreased.169 If ITA follows this pattern, case 
selection effects could lead to investor success levels decreasing over 
time as ITA diffuses, the docket expands, and the risk of pursuing 
claims decreases.170 
Overall, ITA outcomes reflected wide variation but a general 
pattern. The pattern exhibited less investor success than some 
commentators suggest and minimal evidence of pro-investor bias. 
Instead, the data provided initial evidence of a pro-state bias that was 
similar to cases in U.S. litigation involving claims against state 
entities. The results also may reflect a case selection effect where 
possibly the most meritorious cases are resolved before initiating ITA 
or nonmeritorious claims are not pursued. Given variation in the 
results, it is constructive to explore variables affecting case disposition 
and its use as a “shadow” for negotiating alternative outcomes. 
IV.  MODELING OUTCOMES: REGRESSION ANALYSES 
The descriptive baseline of amounts claimed and outcomes 
provides a starting point for understanding ITA. Yet, it does not 
explain the variation in outcomes. Scholarship has not yet identified 
meaningful links between ITA outcomes and respondent state-
development status,171 presiding arbitrator background,172 whether an 
 
 167. Id. (observing that domestic entities suing foreigners exhibited less success with a 
median demand of US$223,494 and median award of US$129,267 and observing that the mean 
demand was US$2,045,194 and the mean award was US$1,398,520). 
 168. Id. at 1141. 
 169. Clermont & Eisenberg, After 9/11, supra note 144, at 451, 453, 463–64. 
 170. The opposite might also occur. Should investors become more risk averse at bringing 
claims given low levels of success and/or third-party funders make it difficult to obtain funding 
to pursue the expensive ITA process, it is possible that only the most serious claims with the 
best chance of success would be pursued. Should that occur, investors’ success could increase as 
less meritorious claims never become formalized.  
 171. Franck, Development, supra note 32, at 439–40. 
 172. Id. Compare Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 23, 32 (suggesting the political preferences 
and repeat appointments of arbitrators are linked to ITA including “[a]rbitrators from 
developing countries are less likely to hold the host country liable because they are more 
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energy dispute was involved, the presence of a Latin American state, 
or whether ITA occurs at ICSID or elsewhere.173 Existing research has 
also not explored the effects of over two independent variables 
simultaneously.174 This may reflect ITA’s historically small caseload 
that makes multiple regression analyses challenging and the lack of a 
theoretical framework.175 
This section therefore expands upon existing research by 
exploring how additional variables and different models affect ITA 
outcomes. It does so by first identifying the type of modeling used. 
Next, we tested two paradigms—namely a case-based and arbitrator-
venue based model—as explanations of ITA outcomes. We tested 
both paradigms using amounts awarded (which used a zero-inflated 
two-part model to test for differences between those cases with and 
without a US$0 award) and relative investor success. Finally, we 
combined the significant predictors from earlier models to create a 
third hybrid model, which was able to reliably predict ITA outcomes 
using relative investor success. 
First, methodologically, we estimated separate regression models 
with SAS PROC GLIMMIX using maximum likelihood estimation176 
for each dependent variable. Continuous variables were centered at 
their mean.177 For categorical variables with multiple levels, we 
 
familiar with the economic and social conditions in developing countries and host countries the 
more likely source of future arbitral appointments”), with Kapeliuk, Repeat Appointment, supra 
note 32, at 80–85 (exploring ITA outcomes as a function of the decisions of “elite” arbitrators 
and finding a lack of relationship). See also Kapeliuk, Games, supra note 32, at 296, 311 
(exploring repeat appointments and panel experience on ITA outcomes). 
 173. Franck, ICSID, supra note 32, at 833. 
 174. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (identifying that research historically focused 
on two independent variables and the interaction effect); supra note 41 and accompanying text 
(providing more sophisticated analysis by controlling for Polity IV). But see Waibel & Wu, 
supra note 82, at 26–40 (providing preliminary unpublished results on various models affecting 
net outcomes but focusing on arbitrator identity). 
 175. See supra notes 36, 42 and accompanying text; Rogers, supra note 124, at 228. 
 176. SAS is a statistical software package, and the SAS PROC GLIMMIX is the statistical 
software procedure that fits models to non-normal data using a generalized linear mixed model. 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation is appropriate for data that are non-continuous (that is, 
binary outcomes) and residuals that are not normally distributed (that is, many zero outcomes 
and skewness). ML uses the normal distribution to estimate parameters (using a series of 
iterations to find the most likely mean that produced the data), whereas Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimation finds the best fitting line by minimizing the squared residuals to find 
parameter estimates.  
 177. Continuous variables were centered at their mean: Polity IV score (M=5.27); 
Claimant’s legal team (M=2.05); Respondent’s legal team (M=3.36); and the Chair’s weighted 
experience as a repeat player (M=2.23).  
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dummy coded using the first variable listed serving as the reference 
group. Parameter estimates for each of the separate models are 
presented in Tables 2 to 6. 
Next, given our interest in exploring alternative paradigms and 
extralegal factors, we initially examined two groups of variables.178 
Under one paradigm, ITA outcomes are a function of the case itself, 
which could reflect a case selection effect influencing disputes 
pursued through ITA and ultimate results.179 Under this model, party 
identity is crucial.180 Given claims of pro-investor bias,181 examining 
 
 178. Because of sample size and degrees of freedom, we examined variables in two different 
paradigms. This permitted examination of more independent variables while testing competing 
ideas of what predicts outcomes (that is, case-related or tribunal-related variables).  
 179. There may be other case-related variables, like sector involved or type of government 
activity generating the dispute, which could influence outcomes. Jeremy Caddel and Nathan 
Jensen’s preliminary research distinguishing among state actors generating disputes—namely 
executive branch, legislatures, subnational activity, state-owned firms, other agencies or 
courts—relies upon a sui generis classification system. Since their research identified that most 
disputes involved executive branch conduct, it is unclear whether this variable would contribute 
meaningful variance. See Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M. Jensen, Which Host Country 
Government Actors Are Most Involved With Disputes With Foreign Investors?, COLUM. FDI 
PERSP., No. 120 (Apr. 28, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-120-Caddel-and-
Jensen-FINAL-WEBSITE-version.pdf [http://perma.cc/KSA4-H3R3]. There is large variance in 
industries involved in ITA. Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 41–43. 
Hypothesizing energy disputes generate a core proportion of ITA disputes and involve large 
claims, we explored whether there was a reliable difference between energy and non-energy 
disputes. We were unable to identify reliable differences in outcomes related to energy disputes 
when analyzing (1) whether investors won or lost and using a Chi-Square Test (χ2(1)=0.843, 
p=.36, r=.08, n=144), (2) inflation-adjusted amounts awarded in all disputes using an Mann-
Whitney two-sample U-test (U=2120.0, Z=-1.513, p=.13, n=144), (3) relative investor success in 
all disputes using a t-test (t(101)=-1.528, p=.13, r=.15, n=103), or (4) relative investor success in 
the subset of cases where investors won using a t-test (t(51)=-0.35, p=.73, r=.05, n=53). Only a 
Mann-Whitney U-test of inflation-adjusted amounts awarded using the subset of cases where 
investors won identified a meaningful difference between amounts awarded for energy and non-
energy disputes (U=239, Z=-2.034, p=.04, r=.12, n=58). The median energy dispute involved 
higher awards (US$41,780,026; IQR=6,438,771-113,451,356) than the median non-energy 
dispute (US$8,000,918; IQR=2,961,702-26,540,200). Although fiscal amounts were visually stark, 
the effect size was statistically small when using Cohen’s threshold for interpreting effect sizes. 
The non-significant results replicated earlier research providing initial evidence that could not 
distinguish between outcomes for energy and non-energy cases. Franck, ICSID, supra note 32, 
at 863–66. As analyses involving energy disputes generated non-significant variance and small 
effect sizes, we did not use this variable. With the lack of statistical power, as the population of 
ITA awards expands, a latent effect could become observable. Whenever we added the energy 
variable to case-based models, all models became non-significant. This suggests caution for 
using energy as an explanatory variable. 
 180. Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from 
Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260, 2260, 2264–65 (2013); Simmons, supra 
note 69, at 198; Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under the 
Shadow of the Dual Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively, 
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investor identity is necessary. The case-based model therefore 
examines two different measures of investor identity. One variable 
identified whether the named claimants in the case were all humans, 
all corporate entities, or some combination thereof.182 A second 
variable explored whether the Financial Times ranked any of the 
named investors as an elite multinational in its top five hundred 
global companies (i.e. a FT500 corporation).183 
The case-based model also examined the background of states 
involved in ITA. As concerns of unfair treatment of developing states 
are arguably conflated with a host state’s democracy levels,184 the 
model explored three types of respondent-related identity variables. 
One variable used the World Bank’s four-category classification of 
state’s development status to identify what level of development the 
state exhibited.185 A second variable identified a state’s democracy 
levels using the Polity IV index.186 Finally, as a core proportion of the 
 
the Equality of Arms, 26 ARB. INT’L 3, 19 (2010); see also Danny J. Boggs, Reining in Judges: 
The Case of Hate Speech, 52 SMU L. REV. 271, 271 (1999) (exploring the theory of party identity 
on litigation outcomes); Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 465, 491–92 (1996) (noting, in the context of U.S. federal litigation, primary theories of 
extra-legal factors affecting outcomes could either be party identity or venue). 
 181. See supra notes 21, 40, 80–82, 139; infra note 197; see also Rogers, supra note 124, at 262 
(observing that critics suggest party identity affects outcome). 
 182. As this measure of investor identity involves a three-category variable, two dummy 
variables analyzed group differences with cases only involving human beings as the reference 
group. For the subset of final awards; 14.5% (n=23) of cases involved claims only by human 
beings; 78.6% (n=125) involved claims brought exclusively by corporate entities; and 6.9% 
(n=11) of cases involved claims brought by a combination of investors who were people and 
corporate entities. 
 183. For final awards, 7.5% (n=12) involved cases where at least one of the named investors 
was a FT500 entity whereas 92.5% (n=147) of cases did not involve even one FT500 entity. 
 184. See, e.g., Franck, Conflating, supra note 41, at 55–64, 68–69. 
 185. The four categories were high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and 
low income. Dummy variables analyzed differences across categories with high income as the 
reference group. 
 186. Recognizing classifications could change over time, state development status and Polity 
IV were coded using the award date. Polity IV is designed to identify the political regime of a 
state. Polity contains information on countries with a population of more than 500,000 people. 
The index places states on a scale in which states with more authoritarian and autocratic 
regimes have lower Polity scores, and states with more democratic regimes have higher scores. 
See Polity IV Project: Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013, CTR. FOR 
SYSTEMIC PEACE & INTEGRATED NETWORK FOR SOCIETAL CONFLICT RESEARCH, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm [http://perma.cc/6U5B-PVD4] (last updated 
June 6, 2014); The Polity Project: About Polity, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE & INTEGRATED 
NETWORK FOR SOCIETAL CONFLICT RESEARCH, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.
html [http://perma.cc/U2BC-SVWY] (last updated 2014). Coding in this Article used 2012 
scores prior to the release of the 2013 Polity IV data. 
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caseload derived from Argentina’s 2001 currency crisis,187 we used a 
variable identifying whether Argentina was the respondent to assess a 
potential “Argentina effect.”188 The objective was to understand the 
generalizability of inferences about one key state’s experiences. 
Building on Marc Galanter’s classic scholarship that repeat 
players (RPs) have strategic advantages in dispute resolution189 and 
suggestions that the effects of RPs may be acute in international 
arbitration,190 the case-based model evaluated the expertise of parties’ 
counsel. After coding all counsel of record in every award, 
irrespective of whether counsel were in-house or external and 
irrespective of which side counsel represented, we identified 420 
different legal entities191 involved in representing parties in ITA.192 As 
approximately 75% of the known legal entities involved in 
representing parties in ITA were only involved in a single case, we 
generated a variable reflecting each legal entity’s relative expertise to 
indicate whether they were a one-shot player or RP with varying 
levels of sophistication.193 Then, as parties often had multiple teams of 
 
 187. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CASELOAD–STATISTICS (Issue 
2012-1) 13 (2012), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/2012-
1%20%20-%20English.pdf [http://perma.cc/94UU-9NKX] (identifying ICSID’s overall caseload 
but separating cases against Argentina).  
 188. Franck, Alvarez Review, supra note 136, at 896. 
 189. Galanter, supra note 86, at 97; see also Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on 
the Scale of Law and its Users, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1387–89 (2006) (providing an overview of 
potential advantages held by RPs). 
 190. See supra note 86; see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out 
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 19 
(1999) (examining the applicability of Galanter’s arguments about comparative advantages in 
arbitration). 
 191. Given varieties in tribunals’ procedures for identifying counsel, legal entities were the 
unit of analysis. Legal entities were external law firms, barristers’ chambers, business units, and 
government departments. Individuals, like Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, were only coded as 
distinct legal entities when s/he had no other formal affiliation. Counsel were primarily 
identified using the award cover page or descriptions as to who appeared in hearings. This 
creates a risk the coding did not fully reflect lawyers who silently assist or ghost-write. As law 
firms have incentives to serve as counsel of record, control proceedings, and participate in 
hearings, this risk could be small.  
 192. RPs were identified using entities named in awards as parties’ counsel of record.  
 193. The underlying assumption was, where firms have a larger number of cases, they will 
have a higher level of sophistication and expertise in ITA, and therefore they deserved a higher 
ranking to reflect a greater relative expertise. We used the distribution of legal entities within 
the data itself to generate break-points. For those legal entities with a single appointment, they 
were ranked as “0” to reflect their status as one-shot players. The distribution indicated that, at 
the 90th percentile, a legal entity had an average of 3.9 cases. For that reason, RPs involved in 
two to four cases were ranked as “1.” The next clear break occurred at the 95th percentile, 
where attorneys’ average number of cases was 6.95 with a meaningful cluster of entities having 
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lawyers, for each team representing the investor, we generated a 
composite variable reflecting the net legal sophistication of all entities 
representing the investor. We repeated this exercise for states to 
identify the net relative expertise of their legal counsel. 
Should the case-based model be significant, it could purely 
reflect a case selection effect whereby investors and their counsel 
choose to pursue particularly meritorious (or unmeritorious) claims. 
The results can also illuminate the variables that may be causally 
proximate, or serve as proxies, for reliably predicting ITA outcomes. 
In either event, knowing whether the case-based model contributes to 
outcomes provides information stakeholders can use to assess 
whether ITA outcomes were random or if certain variables 
contributed to arbitration risk that states may wish to minimize.194 
Under a second paradigm, ITA outcomes derive from 
characteristics of the arbitrators, tribunal composition, and the venue 
of the dispute. Irrespective of whether ITA arbitrators are viewed as 
part of the problem or part of the solution,195 arbitrator identity is 
frequently used to explain ITA outcomes.196 Drawing on literature 
 
5–6 cases; for that reason, RPs with five to six cases were ranked as “2.” Thereafter, there were 
twenty-one legal entities remaining. The next clear break occurred for the twelve entities that 
were in the bottom portion of that group, and those RPs with seven to nine cases were ranked 
as “3.” Finally, the remaining top nine RPs, namely those with eleven or more cases, were coded 
as “4.” The individual values for each legal entity were then added to all the other values of 
other legal entities (if any) representing a party to create a single “legal team” measure for both 
claimants and respondents. We used a binary definition of RPs to assess robustness. See infra 
note 211. 
 194. Although another case-model variable would be a case’s legal merits, we previously 
explored the difficulty of identifying legal correctness. See supra notes 123–24, 149 and 
accompanying text; see also Gallus, supra note 149, at 67 (“[D]ecisions are certainly not always 
consistent and a decision on the interpretation of a provision is far from a guarantee that a 
similar provision, or even the same provision, will be interpreted the same way by another 
tribunal.”); Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: Arbitration Without Legitimacy, 
AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY (June 7, 2013), http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202603368340/
The-Global-Lawyer-Arbitration-Without-Legitimacy [http://perma.cc/3BV7-XUFL] (quoting 
Catherine Rogers’s statement that “no study can control for the correct legal outcome”). Others 
struggle with addressing legal correctness of ITA outcomes. Rogers, supra note 124, at 234 n.42 
(noting that Waibel and Wu attempted to control for a case’s strength and legal correctness “by 
having those challenges assessed by a panel of reputable investment arbitration specialists” after 
the dispute was decided). Such an approach, however, generates a risk of hindsight bias. 
 195. See Rogers, supra note 124, at 226–28 (identifying competing narratives about how ITA 
arbitrators generate serious problems in ITA or provide a valuable service).  
 196. Brekoulakis, supra note 24, at 4; Chiara Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the 
Beholder? The Perils and Benefits of Empirical Research in International Investment Arbitration, 
12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 263, 265 (2014); see supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of concerns about ITA. 
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about ideological affiliations of U.S. judges,197 some commentators 
focus on the influence of arbitrators’ personal characteristics on 
outcome.198 Related variables include arbitrator gender,199 the number 
of appointments,200 and attributes of tribunal chairs who serve as 
potential swing votes.201 The tribunal-based model therefore explored 
several tribunal-focused variables. First, as it was rare for ITA 
tribunals to have two or more women,202 gender was a binary variable 
that solely differentiated between tribunals with at least one female 
member and all-male tribunals. Second, another variable 
differentiated between arbitrators’ development status on the basis of 
how the World Bank classified the development level of the state of 
 
 197. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & 
ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (2006). In ITA, ideological divides do not involve traditional liberal-conservative 
divides, as it is not a uniform transnational concept (i.e. UK conservatives could be liberals in 
the USA); rather, ideological dynamics involve “pro-state” preference for state sovereignty or 
“pro-investor” preference for protecting property rights. Giorgetti, supra note 196, at 268; 
Rogers, supra note 124, at 238–39; Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 21–22. 
 198. See George Kahale III, Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken?, 9 TRANSNAT’L DISP. 
MGMT., no. 7, Dec. 2012, at 3 (“[E]xperienced practitioners too often can predict the outcome of 
[ITA] based upon the composition of the tribunal.”); Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 6–7, 9–11, 
35–37 (exploring extralegal factors effecting ITA decisions and identifying that developing 
world arbitrators were more likely to confirm jurisdiction than developed world arbitrators). 
Waibel and Wu offered a granular analysis of arbitrator background, including legal system of 
origin (including common and civil law), graduation from “elite” law schools (defined as 
training only from Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Oxford or Cambridge), and experience as 
practitioners, government officials, or judges. Id. at 27–28. 
 199. See Giorgetti, supra note 196, at 265–66 n.7, 270–71 (reviewing research identifying the 
lack of women in ITA); Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 34 (identifying female arbitrators were 
more likely to affirm jurisdiction decisions but were unrelated to ultimate outcomes); id. at 38 
(failing to find a significant relationship with chair gender and jurisdiction or liability). 
 200. Kapeliuk, Repeat Appointment, supra note 32, at 68, 79–89; Waibel & Wu, supra note 
82, at 22.  
 201. See generally Franck, Development, supra note 32 (discussing factors affecting tribunal 
outcomes); Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, 31–32 (focusing on the political preferences and repeat 
appointments of arbitrators to predict ITA outcomes). See also Kahale, supra note 198, at 4–6 
(suggesting party appointments drive outcomes); Maupin, supra note 40, at 386 (“[C]ritics 
contend that a systemic bias extends to presiding arbitrators as well—the crucial swing vote . . . . 
[B]ecause all three arbitrators are paid by the disputing parties, and only investors (not states) 
can initiate arbitration proceedings, presiding arbitrators who wish to safeguard the possibility 
of future investor-state arbitration appointments have an incentive to ensure that investors 
win.”). As both parties can appoint one arbitrator and all arbitrators must be impartial, legal 
regulation theoretically decreases risk of bias.  
 202. Out of the 247 arbitrators, only nine arbitrators were women. As female arbitrators had 
repeat appointments, for final awards, 15.7% (n=25) of tribunals included at least one woman. 
The remaining 84.3% (n=134) of tribunals contained only men. See also supra note 121.  
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their nationality.203 Third, a variable distinguished between chairs’ 
relative expertise and explored how often chairs had repeat 
appointments.204 Finally, given claims that ICSID is a biased forum,205 
the model explored arbitration venue and looked for differences 
between cases administered at ICSID and those administered 
elsewhere (that is, cases at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or 
ad hoc arbitrations). 
To assess the two models of explaining ITA outcomes, the 
research analyzed the dependent variables of amounts awarded and 
relative success. In light of the number of predictors of interest and 
the sample size, testing the two models separately permitted 
assessment of a greater number of potential predictors. We also used 
a hybrid model, combining significant case-based and tribunal-venue-
based variables, to assess whether case-based variables remained 
predictive. 
A. Amounts Awarded 
We estimated a zero-inflated two-part model based on adaptive 
quadrature to examine whether our hypothesized variables predicted 
amounts awarded. This procedure allows estimation of dependent 
variables with semicontinuous data that contain multiple zeros and 
right-skewed distribution of positive values, including amounts 
awarded where many cases had a US$0 award and the remainder of 
the awards exhibited positive skewing.206 The first part of the model 
 
 203. Nationals from high-income states dominated the arbitrators deciding ITA disputes. It 
was rare for arbitrators to be nationals of upper-middle income, lower-middle income or low 
income states. We created a three-level categorical variable reflecting the combined total for the 
development background of the tribunal including (1) tribunals composed exclusively of all 
high-income arbitrators, (2) tribunals composed of two high -income arbitrators and one 
developing-country arbitrator; and (3) tribunals composed of one high-income arbitrator and 
two developing-country arbitrators. Given the small number (under seven) of ITA tribunals 
composed exclusively of developing country arbitrators, this was not the focus of analysis. 
 204. Repeat-player arbitrators were identified using all 272 awards in the dataset. Of those 
248 different arbitrators, 58.9% were appointed once. The weighted variable for arbitrators was 
constructed similarly to the weighted variables for the expertise of parties’ legal teams. See 
supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. We used the distribution of appointments within the 
data to generate break-points. Arbitrators who were one-shot players were coded as “0.” 
Arbitrators with 2–3 cases (in the 60–82th percentile) were coded as “1”; arbitrators with 4–6 
cases (in the 83–91st percentile) were coded as “2,” arbitrators with 7–8 cases (in the 92–95th 
percentile) were coded as “3,” and those arbitrators with more than 9 cases (top 4%) were 
coded as “4.” 
 205. Trakman, TPP, supra note 15, at 14–15. 
 206. When zero values indicate the absence of an occurrence, rather than the lowest number 
of a continuum, it is improper to treat zeros as a point on the continuum; zeros must therefore 
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values zeros (US$0 awards) using a binary logit distribution and the 
second part models positive continuous data with a lognormal 
distribution. Although the models have separate regression weights, 
the models are estimated simultaneously.207 Functionally, the initial 
zero-model is roughly equivalent to a predictive model for a binary 
win/loss dependent variable as it seeks to predict whether an investor 
secured any fiscal award, irrespective of the actual amount. In 
contrast, the continuous model focuses more upon the absolute 
degree of remuneration. 
Table 2 reflects the results for the regression model for the case-
based approach. Both regression models, namely the zero model 
[F(10,182)=2.55, p<.01, n=94] and the continuous model 
[F(10,182)=4.71, p<.001, n=55], significantly predicted amounts 
awarded in ITA disputes. There was a medium effect size (r =.34)208 
accounting for 12% of the variance. 
Within the zero model, the identity of an investor and the 
claimant’s legal team’s prior experience significantly predicted 
whether there was an amount awarded. The role of investor identity, 
however, was complicated. The zero-model suggested that, when the 
claimant was a corporation (as opposed to a human being), then 
amounts awarded were more likely to be a zero (that is, a non-award 
and determination of no state liability); in contrast, human beings 
were more likely to be awarded some dollar amount. If none of the 
named investors in a case were classified as a FT500 corporation, 
outcomes were more likely to be a non-award; but, when at least one 
of the named investors was a FT500 entity, then the case was more 
likely to result in state liability.209 When viewing ITA from the 
 
be analyzed separately from continuous values. Kevin L. Delucchi & Alan Bostrom, Methods 
for Analysis of Skewed Data Distributions in Clinical Studies: Working With Many Zero Values, 
161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1159, 1159, 1161–66 (2004). 
 207. These models are widely accepted in quantitative studies in criminology, economics, 
political science and sociology. David C. Atkins & Robert J. Gallop, Rethinking How Family 
Researchers Model Infrequent Outcomes: A Tutorial on Count Regression and Zero Inflated 
Models, 21 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 726, 726–34 (2007).  
 208. Because r-values are not readily available using two-part models, r was calculated for 
both models simultaneously by estimating the correlation of the predicted outcomes and the 
expected outcomes.  
 209. We looked further into named investors’ corporate chain to explore whether investors’ 
direct parent companies were FT500 entities. Where any of the named investors or a direct 
parent was listed on the FT500, this was coded as the case involving a FT500 entity; all other 
cases were coded as non-FT500 cases. For the subset of final awards, 8.8% (n=14) of cases 
involved a case where at least one investor (or a parent) was listed on the FT500; and for the 
remaining 91.2% (n=145) cases, none of the named investors or their immediate corporate 
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perspective of human beings initiating claims, people fared relatively 
well; but viewing investor identity from the perspective of whether 
they were large multinational investors, large investors fared 
relatively well. These dual perspectives are not necessarily 
inconsistent as they reflect different systemic experiences of 
investors.210 Both variables reflected that investor identity contributed 
meaningfully to ITA outcomes, albeit in different ways. In addition, 
only for the claimant’s legal team, the less experienced the claimant’s 
legal team, the more likely the amounts awarded were a non-award. 
The more experienced the claimant’s legal team, the more likely the 
investor would obtain some form of recovery.211 
Within the continuous model, there were two significant 
predictors. The experience of claimant’s legal team continued to be a 
critical variable of amounts awarded. Once again, where an investor’s 
legal team exhibited more experience, the amount awarded to the 
investor also increased. In addition, although it was the only time our 
models indicated a state’s development status was a significant 
predictor of outcome,212 the continuous model identified a link with a 
 
parent(s) were FT500 entities. We used this broader conception of investor identity to analyze 
whether this construction of investor identity was a meaningful predictor of outcomes and to 
assess whether the initial FT500 definition was a robust predictor. For both the zero and 
continuous models, expanding FT500 to look at the corporate chain did not alter significance 
tests outcomes (zero model: B=-2.13, SE=0.79, t=-2.70, p<.01; continuous model: B=-0.86, 
SE=0.52, t=1.66, p=0.10). The predictive ability of the models also did not change (zero model: 
[F(10,182)=2.64, p<.01]; continuous model: [F(10,182)=4.97, p<.001]; r=.33).  
 210. We observe that both groups were relatively small. When focusing on investor identity, 
cases involving only people were less than 16% of final awards, whereas cases involving at least 
one FT500 investor were less than 8% of final awards. See supra notes 182–83 and 
accompanying text. 
 211. We created another binary variable for identifying whether attorneys were RPs. As 
identified in text accompanying footnotes 192–93, 75% of all legal entities in ITA were one-shot 
players and coded as “0” to reflect their failure to act as RPs. Those legal entities involved in 
multiple ITA cases were coded as “1,” irrespective of how many cases they were involved with 
and whether the representation had involved the investor, state or both. Using those raw binary 
codes, we then created a composite variable for each party to generate the total sum of RPs on 
each party’s legal team. For both the zero and continuous models, changing the definition of RP 
counsel to a binary, instead of a weighted, measure did not change the results. The case-based 
models remained significant; and while the expertise of claimant’s counsel was a significant 
predictor for both the zero and continuous models (zero model: B=-0.77, SE=0.29, t=-2.62, 
p<0.01; continuous model: B=0.63, SE=0.27, t=2.34, p<0.05), the expertise of respondent’s 
counsel was not a significant predictor for either model (zero model: B=0.04, SE=0.09, t=0.43, 
p=.67; continuous model: B=0.08, SE=0.08, t=0.96, p=0.34). The predictive ability of the models 
also did not change (zero model: [F(10,182)=2.41, p<.01]; continuous model: [F(10,182)=4.23, 
p<.001]; r=.33). 
 212. We examined two additional measures of respondent development status: how the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) scored the respondent state’s Human 
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state’s World Bank status and amounts awarded: upper-middle 
income states (as compared to high-income states) experienced 
higher amounts awarded.213 No other variables were significant 
predictors of amounts awarded in ITA for either the zero or 
continuous model.214  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development Index (HDI) and whether the state was a member of the OECD. When the model 
substituted HDI and OECD for the World Bank classification, neither significantly predicted 
outcome nor otherwise altered model parameters. This was true for both the HDI measure 
(zero model: B=1.76, SE=2.07, t=0.85, p=0.40; continuous model: B=0.77, SE=2.42, t=0.32, 
p=0.75) and the OECD measure (zero model: B=0.06, SE=0.49, t=-0.12, p=0.91; continuous 
model: B=-0.23, SE=0.02, t=-0.42, p=0.67). For HDI, the predictive ability of the models also did 
not change (zero model: [F(8,184)=3.00, p<.01]; continuous model: [F(8,184)=4.95, p<.001]; 
r=.33). For OECD, the predictive ability of the models also did not change (zero model: 
[F(8,186)=2.98, p<.01]; continuous model: [F(8,186)=4.96, p<.001]; r=.33).  
 213. Recent research demonstrated a meaningful difference in amounts awarded, where 
upper-middle income states experienced larger amounts awarded when compared with high 
income states. Franck, Conflating, supra note 41, at 48 fig.2 (demonstrating broader variance in 
amounts awarded against upper-middle income states, but smaller variance in awards against 
high-income, lower-middle and low income states). No other models, using either HDI or 
OECD scores, revealed a meaningful difference in amounts awarded; and once a respondent 
state’s internal democracy scores were controlled for, all models analyzed could not generate a 
meaningful link to a respondent’s development status. Id. at 57–58 tbls. 8 & 9. The World Bank 
always classified Argentina as an upper-middle state; and, for the zero model, the presence of 
Argentina was close to significant (p=.10).  
 214. Some variables in the zero-model were approaching significance. For states, World 
Bank classification (high income versus mid-high income; and high income versus low income), 
had a p-value of .09 and .07, respectively. The presence of Argentina was also potentially linked 
to amounts awarded. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. None of the other variables in 
the continuous models approached significance.  
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Table 2: Case-related Two Part Regression Model Predicting Amounts 
Awarded 
Variable B SE t p 
Zero Model 
   Intercept 
 
1.01 0.77 1.32 0.19 
   Investor Type  
   (0 = human being, 1 = corporation) 
 
1.08 0.54 2.01 0.05* 
   Investor Type  
   (0 = human being,  
    1 = corporation and human being) 
 
1.55 1.97 1.29 0.20 
   FT500 Corporation  
   (0 = Investor(s) not FT500 corporation, 
    1 = Investor(s) was FT500 corporation) 
 
-2.43 0.93 -2.60 <0.01** 
   Claimant Attorney Experience 
 
-0.31 0.11 -2.91 <0.01** 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent upper-middle income state) 
 
-1.18 0.69 -1.71 0.09 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent lower-middle income state) 
 
-1.13 0.73 -1.54 0.13 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent low income state) 
 
-1.77 0.95 -1.85 0.07 
   Respondent Polity IV Score 
 
0.03 0.03 1.08 0.28 
   Argentina  
   (0 = Respondent was not Argentina,  
    1 = Respondent was Argentina) 
 
-1.21 0.73 -1.65 0.10 
   Respondent Attorney Experience 
 
0.04 0.09 0.45 0.65 
Continuous Model 
   Intercept 
 
13.93 0.85 16.39 <0.001*** 
   Investor Type  
    (0 = human being, 1 = corporation) 
 
0.73 0.57 1.28 0.20 
   Investor Type  
   (0 = human being,  
    1 = corporation & human being) 
 
1.09 1.53 0.71 0.48 
   FT500 Corporation  
   (0 = Investor(s) not FT500 corporation, 
    1 = Investor(s) was FT500 corporation) 
 
0.63 0.55 1.15 0.25 
FRANCK & WYLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2015  4:42 PM 
2015] INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 509 
 
Variable B SE t P 
   Claimant Attorney Experience 
 
0.27 0.10 2.86 <0.01** 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent upper-middle income state) 
 
1.61 0.81 1.98 <0.05* 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent lower-middle income state) 
 
1.34 0.83 1.62 0.11 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent low income state) 
 
0.80 0.98 0.82 0.41 
   Respondent Polity Score  
 
-0.03 0.02 -1.53 0.13 
   Argentina  
   (0 = Respondent was not Argentina,  
    1 = Respondent was Argentina) 
 
0.82 0.59 1.40 0.16 
   Respondent Attorney Experience 
 
0.06 0.08 0.48 0.48 
Zero model, F(10,182)=2.55, p<.01, n=94; Continuous model F(10,182)=4.71, p<.001, n=55. For 
both models, r=.34 accounted for 12% of the variance. Continuous variables were centered at 
their mean. Zero model was analyzed using a binary distribution, and continuous model was 
analyzed using a lognormal distribution. Estimates for zero model are reported as log odds 
values and estimates for the continuous model are reported as logged values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01, 
*** p<.001. 
 
Next, we examined the tribunal-venue model. Table 3 reflects 
the results of the regression models for the tribunal-venue-based 
approach. Neither the zero model [F(5,204)=2.04, p=.07, n=100] nor 
the continuous model [F(5,204)=1.34, p=.24, n=58] significantly 
predicted amounts awarded. There was still a medium effect size 
(r=.30) accounting for 9% of the variance, possibly because the zero 
model approached significance.215 
Despite both models lacking predictive ability, the development 
status of arbitrators was linked to outcomes only in the tribunal-
venue zero-model. One dummy variable related to the tribunal World 
Bank development status individually predicted whether there would 
be an award (versus a non-award). If all arbitrators on the tribunal 
were nationals of states the World Bank classified as high income, as 
compared to tribunals with two high-income arbitrators (and one 
 
 215. Because r-values are not available using two-part models, r was calculated for both 
models simultaneously by estimating the correlation of predicted and expected outcomes. 
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non-high income, developing-world arbitrator), then the award was 
more likely to be zero (that is, no finding of state liability).216 There 
were no other significant predictors of amounts awarded for either 
the zero or continuous models using the tribunal-venue paradigm.217 
  
 
 216. Similarly, we observe that the second dummy variable for the tribunals’ development 
status was on the cusp of significance (p=.07). The direction was such that, when comparing 
tribunals completely comprised of high-income arbitrators with tribunals containing two non-
high-income (i.e. developing world) arbitrators, the awards rendered by high-income arbitrators 
were more likely to be a zero (i.e. no finding of state liability). 
 217. Although it was non-significant (the parameter estimate was p=.07), there was a facial 
trend with RP chairs and outcomes. Where a chair had more experience as arbitrator, the case 
seemed to be more likely to result in an award (i.e. some form of state liability). As indicated in 
footnote 204, for the 248 different arbitrators, 58.9% were involved in a single case. We 
generated a binary variable that indicated whether each arbitrator—including the chair—in an 
award arbitrated either a single case (i.e. a one-shot player, coded as “0”) or multiple cases (i.e. 
a RP coded as “1”). In addition to the weighted chair repeat variable, we examined the chair’s 
RP status using a second variable. For the set of 202 cases in the dataset, 13.4% (n=27) had a 
chair that was a one-shot player; in slight contrast, for the set of 159 final awards, 15.1% (n=24) 
had a chair that was a one-shot player. Using the binary variable to reflect a chair’s status as an 
RP, instead of the weighted variable, changed the significance test for a repeat chair in the zero-
model, but not the continuous model (zero model: B=0.98, SE=0.48, t=2.02, p<0.05; continuous 
model: B=1.09, SE=0.72, t=1.72, p=0.13). The non-significant patterns mirrored Waibel and 
Wu’s tentative results. For ultimate liability in ICSID cases, they failed to identify that RP 
chairs made different liability findings based on earlier appointments. For jurisdiction, where 
investors previously appointed the arbitrator, chairs were more likely to find jurisdiction; but 
chairs previously appointed by states were less likely to find jurisdiction; but there was no 
relationship with jurisdiction decisions for chairs who had previously served as chairs. Waibel & 
Wu, supra note 82, at 37–38.  
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Table 3: Tribunal-Venue-related Two Part Regression Models 
Predicting Amounts Awarded 
Variable B SE t P 
Zero Model 
   Intercept 
 
1.09 0.32 3.50 <0.001*** 
   Tribunal Gender  
   (0 = all male, 1 = at least 1 woman) 
 
-0.19 0.48 -0.40 0.69 
   Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
   (0= all high income arbitrators,  
    1 = two high income arbitrators) 
 
-0.85 0.38 -2.27 <0.05* 
   Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
   (0= all high income arbitrators,  
    1 = two non-high income,  
      developing world arbitrators) 
 
-0.99 0.55 -1.81 0.07 
   Chair’s Status as Repeat Player
    
0.22 0.12 1.80 0.07 
   ICSID Venue  
   (0 = ICSID is the venue,  
    1 = ICSID is not the venue) 
 
-0.13 0.39 -0.32 0.75 
Continuous Model 
   Intercept 
 
16.65 0.67 29.70 <0.001*** 
   Tribunal Gender  
   (0 = all male, 1 = at least 1 woman) 
 
-0.21 0.74 -0.28 0.78 
   Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
   (0= all high income arbitrators,  
    1 = two high income,  
      developing world arbitrators) 
 
-0.47 0.62 -0.76 0.45 
   Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
   (0= all high income arbitrators,  
    1 = two non-high income,  
      developing world arbitrators) 
 
0.72 0.81 0.90 0.37 
   Chair’s Status as Repeat Player
    
0.12 0.18 0.63 0.53 
   ICSID Venue  
   (0 = ICSID is the venue,  
    1 = ICSID is not the venue) 
 
-0.78 0.66 -1.19 0.24 
 
Zero model F(5,204)=1.90, p=.09, n=100; Continuous model F(5,204)=0.93, p=.46, n=58. For 
both models, r=.30, accounting for 9% of the variance. Continuous variables were centered at 
their mean. Zero model was analyzed using a binary distribution and continuous model was 
analyzed using a lognormal distribution. Estimates for zero model are reported as log odds 
values and estimates for the continuous model are reported as logged values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01, 
*** p<.001. 
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B. Relative Investor Success 
Earlier models reflected amounts awarded, without reference to 
investor’s relative success. Although examining amounts awarded is a 
constructive way of understanding ITA outcomes, it nevertheless fails 
to reflect the variance between claimants’ initial demand and the 
ultimate result. To address this gap, and offer perspective of relative 
outcomes, we tested the investors’ relative success variable using the 
variables from the case-based and tribunal-venue-based models. 
As with earlier analyses,218 relative success was the continuous 
proportion outcome restricted by the interval (0, 1). As predictions 
for relative success uses a proportion, this analysis excludes cases with 
zero values; therefore, these models used regression with a beta 
distribution and a logit link.219 Our aim was to estimate a model of 
relative claimant success rate based on both the case-model and the 
tribunal-venue models.220 
Table 4 reflects the results for the regression model of claimant’s 
relative success using the case-based approach. Several aspects of the 
case-based paradigm were replicated using investors’ relative success 
as the method of understanding outcomes. 
First, the regression model testing the case-based paradigm 
significantly predicted claimant relative success [F(10, 40)=1.80, 
p=.05, n=51]. The effect size was large (r=.56) and accounted for 31% 
of the variance.221 Second, as with the zero-model exploring raw state 
liability, investor identity significantly predicted investors’ relative 
success rate, but this time, the only reliable predictor of investor-
identity was whether investors were humans.222 The nature of the 
 
 218. See supra Part IV.C. 
 219. Silvia L. P. Ferrari & Francisco Cribari-Neto, Beta Regression for Modelling Rates and 
Proportions, 31 J. APPLIED STAT. 799, 799–811 (2004). 
 220. Although it was non-significant (parameter estimate was p=.11), a similar phenomenon 
was present when comparing cases brought by people and those brought by a combination of 
people and corporations. The relationship was that, facially, human beings had higher relative 
success than cases initiated by a combined group. 
 221. Investor success rate models excluded cases where states won (that is, investor success 
rate of 0%). This decreases n as compared to earlier models. When including success rates of 
0%, the case-based model was non-predictive [F(10,89)=1.07, p=.38, n=100].  
 222. The FT500 variable was close to predicting relative investor success (p=.08). But see 
infra note 224 (suggesting respondent democracy levels were also close to significance for 
predicting outcomes). Using the broader conception of investor identity to consider the FT500 
corporate chain, supra note 209, investors’ corporate chain was not a significant predictor of 
ITA outcomes [B=0.62, SE=0.36, t=1.73, p=.09]. See also infra note 227 (indicating the original 
FT500 variable, focusing only on the named investors, approached significance). Using the 
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relationship was that cases with only people had higher relative 
success rates than cases involving purely corporate entities. 
Third, the expertise of counsel also significantly contributed to 
ITA outcomes for relative investor success. Unlike the earlier 
amounts awarded models, however, the important variable was not 
that the investor’s counsel experience generated the significant link. 
Rather, the experience that provided a meaningful predictor of 
outcome was the expertise of respondent’s counsel. Specifically, a less 
experienced state legal team resulted in greater relative investor 
success; and a more experienced state legal team resulted in lower 
relative investor success.223 No other variables were significant 
predictors of investors’ relative success in ITA. 
As a final matter, although states’ democracy levels trended in 
the direction of predicting investors’ relative success,224 the dummy 
variables for respondent World Bank classification and the presence 
of Argentina were not significant.225 
 
broader definition of investors’ FT500 status, the model was no longer significant at the p=.05 
level [F(10,40)=1.76, p=.06, r=.56]. 
 223. The experience of claimants’ legal team was non-significant (p=.11). To assess 
robustness of the models and measures, we substituted the expertise of investors’ legal team and 
respondents’ legal team to use the blunt composite binary variable described in note 211. 
Substituting the binary variables of parties’ legal expertise in Table 4 for the weighted variables 
of parties’ legal expertise rendered the model non-significant [F(10,40)=1.45, p=.15, n=51, 
r=.53]. The expertise of respondents’ legal team no longer significantly predicted investors’ 
relative success [B=-0.28, SE=0.16, t=-1.76, p=.09]; claimants’ legal team was still a non-predictor 
[B=0.34, SE=0.18, t=1.90, p=.06]. 
 224. For Polity IV (p=.06), the greater a state’s democracy levels, the lower the investor’s 
relative success; conversely, the lower a state’s democracy levels, the higher the investor’s 
relative success. Unlike the zero-model, neither respondent’s World Bank classification nor 
presence of Argentina was close to significance; and unlike the continuous model, respondent’s 
World Bank classification was far from significant.  
 225. We again substituted both respondent HDI and OECD variables for World Bank to 
assess model robustness. The case-based model of relative investor substituting HDI remained 
significant [F(8,42)=2.19, p<.05, r=.56]; and, like the World Bank definition of development 
status, HDI remained a non-significant predictor [B=1.74, SE=1.53, t=1.14, p=.26]. Likewise, 
when using a state’s OECD membership as an alternative proxy for development status, the 
case-based model remained significant [F(8,42)=2.50, p<.05, r=.56]. Although a state’s OECD 
membership remained a non-significant predictor [B=0.71, SE=0.39, t=1.85, p=.07], there were 
two other variations where variables became significant predictors. First, investors’ FT500 status 
became a significant predictor (B=0.91, SE=0.40, t=2.28, p<0.05). Where the case involved at 
least one FT500 company, investors had higher levels of relative success, but cases without any 
FT500 entity experienced lower levels of relative success. Second, Polity IV became a significant 
predictor when substituting OECD status [B=-0.02, SE=0.01, t=-2.02, p=0.05]. The pattern was 
states with higher democracy levels had lower relative liability, whereas states with lower levels 
of democracy experienced greater liability. 
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Table 4: Case-related Regression Party/Attorney Regression Model 
Predicting Claimant Relative Success Rate 
Variable B SE t p 
   Intercept 
 
0.17 0.65 0.26 0.80 
   Investor Type  
   (0 = human being, 1 = corporation) 
 
-0.86 0.39 -2.23 <0.05* 
   Investor Type  
   (0 = human being,  
    1 = corporation and human being) 
 
-1.78 1.08 -1.64 0.11 
   FT500 Corporation  
   (0 = Investor(s) not FT500 corporation, 
    1 = Investor(s) was FT500 corporation) 
 
0.69 0.37 1.53 0.08 
   Claimant Attorney Experience
 
0.11 0.07 1.62 0.11 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent upper-middle income state) 
      
-0.50 0.60 -0.83 0.41 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent lower-middle income state) 
 
-0.47 0.62 -0.76 0.45 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent low income state) 
 
-0.87 0.69 -1.26 0.21 
   Respondent Polity IV Score 
 
-0.02 0.01 -1.91 0.06 
   Argentina  
   (0 = Respondent was not Argentina,  
    1 = Respondent was Argentina) 
 
0.32 0.40  0.78 0.44 
   Respondent Attorney Experience 
 
-0.21 0.07 -2.95 <0.01** 
F(10,40)=1.80, p=.05, r=.56 (accounting for 32% of the variance). Continuous variables were 
centered at their mean. Model was analyzed using a beta distribution. Estimates are reported as 
log odds values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
Table 5 reflects the results for the regression model of claimant’s 
relative success using the tribunal-venue-based paradigm. Changing 
the dependent variable to relative success replicated several aspects 
of the earlier findings of the tribunal-venue model. First, the model 
testing the tribunal-case-based paradigm also failed to predict relative 
investor success [F(5,46)=0.63, p=.67, n=52]. The model had a small 
effect size (r=.07) and accounted for less than 1% of the variance. 
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Replicating earlier results for amounts awarded for both the zero 
and continuous models, none of the individual variables significantly 
predicted relative investor success.226 The only other variation from 
the earlier model was that, unlike the zero-based model, the tribunal’s 
composite development status did not significantly predict relative 
investor success. 
Table 5: Tribunal-Venue-Related Regression Model Predicting 
Claimant Relative Success Rate 
Variable B SE t p 
   Intercept 
 
-0.69 0.30 -2.33 <0.05* 
   Tribunal Gender  
   (0 = all male, 1 = at least 1 woman) 
 
-0.01 0.41 -0.02 0.98 
   Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
   (0= all high income arbitrators,  
    1 = two high income arbitrators) 
 
-0.24 0.33 -0.73 0.47 
   Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
   (0= all high income arbitrators,  
    1 = two non-high income,  
      developing world arbitrators) 
 
0.34 0.41 0.83 0.41 
   Chair’s Status as Repeat Player
 
-0.02 0.10 -0.15 0.88 
   ICSID Venue  
   (0 = ICSID is the venue,  
    1 = ICSID is not the venue) 
 
0.25 0.37 0.70 0.49 
F(5,46)=0.63, p=.67, r=.07 (accounted for less than 1% of the variance). Continuous variables 
were centered at their mean. Model was analyzed using a beta distribution. Estimates are 
reported as log odds values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
C. A Combined Approach 
As a final effort to explore relationships of variables from both 
models, we generated a third hybrid model. The hybrid model used 
investor success rate as our dependent variable and included variables 
from both the case-based and arbitrator-venue-based models. To 
estimate the relative contribution of the significant case-based 
variables and significant arbitration-venue variables, we only included 
variables that were significant in any of the earlier models. Results for 
 
 226. As with the zero and continuous models, see supra notes 204 and 217, we tested the 
chair’s RP status using an alternative definition of previous appointments. The substitution 
neither changed the significance of the tribunal-venue model [F(5,46)=0.63, p=.68, r=.08] nor 
transformed a chair’s RP status to a significant predictor [B=-0.02, SE=0.36, t=-0.05, p=.96].  
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the combined relative success rate regression model are presented in 
Table 6. The combined model revealed that the model still predicted 
investors’ relative success (F(8,40)=2.03, p<.05, n=51). There was also 
a large effect size (r=.52) accounting for 27% of the variance. 
The results provide evidence of the robustness of the variables in 
the case-based model. The variables related to investor identity 
remained significant. Where cases involved only human beings 
bringing claims, investors were likely to achieve higher levels of 
relative success than cases brought solely by corporations; yet, 
simultaneously, FT500 entities were also more likely to experience 
higher levels of success as compared to non-FT500 entities.227 
Similarly, the experience of respondents’ legal teams continued to 
predict relative investor success. When states had experienced legal 
teams, investors had lower levels of relative success. The relative 
success of investors’ legal teams was, however, on the cusp of 
significance (p=.07), but the direction remained consistent with 
earlier tests whereby when investors had experienced teams, investors 
had higher levels of relative success.228 
Other variables remained non-significant in the combined model. 
The model was unable to identify any meaningful predictive value for 
tribunal gender composition, composite tribunal development 
status,229 chair experience, and whether ICSID was the venue. In a 
slight variation, respondents’ Polity IV score no longer approached 
significance for investor success. 
  
 
 227. FT500 resulted in a p=.05 significance test. Expanding FT500 to look at the corporate 
chain altered the results (B=0.59, SE=0.36, t=1.63, p=0.11). The predictive ability of the model 
went below the p<.05 threshold [F(8,40)=1.82, p=.07, r=.51], but the effect size remained large. 
 228. Substituting the weighted expertise of parties’ counsel to the binary variables of RP 
counsel for both investors and states changed the results. The combined model was no longer 
significant [F(8,40)=1.81, p=.07, r=.48]. Furthermore, neither claimants’ legal expertise [B=0.33, 
SE=0.17, t=1.90, p=.06], nor respondents’ legal expertise was significant (B=-0.27, SE=0.16, 
t=-1.71, p=.09) using the blunt binary definition. 
 229. We substituted HDI and OECD measures as proxies for states’ development status. 
The HDI model remained significant [F(8,42)=2.03, p<.05, r=.52], and HDI was a non-
significant predictor of investor success [B=0.03, SE=1.14, t=0.03, p=.98]. All other variables 
retained similar levels when substituting HDI. Substituting states’ OECD membership likewise 
changed nothing. The hybrid model remained significant [F(8,42)=2.23, p<.05, r=.51], but 
OECD status was a non-significant predictor [B=0.41, SE=0.35, t=1.20, p=.24].  
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Table 6: Combined Model Predicting Claimant Relative Success Rate 
Variable B SE t p 
   Intercept 
 
0.29 0.50 0.58 <0.05* 
   Investor Type  
   (0 = human being, 1 = corporation) 
 
-0.97 0.40 -2.31 <0.05* 
   Investor Type  
   (0 = human being,  
    1 = corporation and human being) 
 
-1.85 1.09 -1.70 0.10 
   FT500 Corporation  
   (0 = Investor(s) not FT500 corporation, 
    1 = Investor(s) was FT500 corporation) 
 
1.07 0.43 2.47 0.05* 
   Claimant Attorney Experience
 
0.12 0.07 2.87 0.07 
   Respondent Attorney Experience
 
-0.20 0.08 -2.55 <0.05* 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent upper-middle income state) 
 
-0.44 0.61 -0.72 0.48 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent lower-middle income state) 
 
-0.40 0.64 -0.62 0.54 
   Respondent World Bank Classification
   (0 = Respondent high income state,  
    1 = Respondent low income state) 
 
-0.60 0.68 -0.88 0.39 
   Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
   (0= all high income arbitrators,  
    1 = two high income arbitrators) 
 
-0.06 0.34 -0.17 0.87 
   Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
   (0= all high income arbitrators,  
    1 = two non-high income,  
      developing world arbitrators) 
 
0.67 0.39 1.71 0.10 
 
F(8,40)=2.03, p<.05, r=.52 (accounting for 27% of the variance). Continuous variables were 
centered at their mean. Model was analyzed using a beta distribution. Estimates are reported as 
log odds values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
The results suggest that the two most robust predictors of ITA 
outcomes involved investor identity and the experience of parties’ 
lawyers. One might hypothesize that these variables may be 
entangled and counsel provide a screening function to identify quality 
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claims and defenses.230 Specifically, sophisticated counsel with an 
appreciation of the likely merits of a claim may be unwilling to take a 
case if they believe it will generate a loss or undermine their firm 
reputation; sophisticated counsel may also actively pursue 
meritorious cases. Likewise, unsophisticated counsel eager to break 
into the ITA marketplace, and who may not fully appreciate the 
complexities of securing favorable outcomes, may represent clients in 
less meritorious cases. As the data reflected differences in how 
counsel’s expertise affected outcomes—with expert investor counsel 
predicting liability and amounts awarded but expert respondent 
counsel predicting relative investor success—it is possible that any 
screening function operates differently for investors and states.231 It is 
also theoretically possible that, irrespective of a screening function, 
quality lawyers may be more adept at selecting arbitrators, making 
procedural decisions, selecting legal arguments that are more likely to 
be favorable to their clients, or some interaction of those variables. 
Ultimately, future research should explore legal expertise to 
understand its impact on the market for legal services and the impact 
on ITA outcomes. 
VI.  LIMITATIONS 
It is important to understand the results within their proper 
context as it restrains the strength of derivative inferences. Part III 
identified limitations of case selection bias. For non-significant 
results, Part V identified limitations related to statistical power. This 
section reinforces those concerns and identifies other limitations. 
First, there may be limitations to the strength of the inferences, 
as they may not reflect population parameters. Inferences should be 
made cautiously, particularly considering the representativeness of 
subsets. Replication with additional data is necessary to avoid 
 
 230. In medical malpractice, there is evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys carefully screen 
cases, weed out less meritorious claims, and thereby contribute to a case selection effect. Hyman 
& Silver, supra note 160, at 1086–88, 1101–03, 1117–22; see also Engstrom, supra note 156, at 
1263–64, 1301 (discussing the speculation that more experienced firms selectively cherry pick 
the most meritorious cases to pursue or defend). 
 231. Experienced investor counsel may be adept at distinguishing between promising and 
unmeritorious claims. By contrast, experienced state counsel may be adept at identifying cases 
suitable for a compelling damages witness, conducting effective cross-examination of expert 
damages witnesses, or using experience to reduce damages. It is possible that experienced 
respondent counsel affected outcomes in more subtle ways, like evaluating the merits of claims, 
the risks of ITA, and encouraging settlements prior to a public award.  
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establishing parameters that could reflect random chance. Second, it 
is always possible that there was an insufficient sample size to predict 
non-significant outcomes. In models that significantly predicted 
outcomes, effect sizes were small to medium, suggesting sufficient 
power. In models that were non-significant, effect sizes were small to 
nonexistent, again suggesting that power was not problematic. 
However, it would be prudent to establish a broader pool of data, 
based on an a priori power analysis, to confirm, contradict, or 
supplement these findings. 
Third, there may be issues related to external validity since the 
results come from data based on publicly available awards. It is 
possible that publicly available awards do not represent the broader 
population of both public and private awards. The data used for the 
analyses was coded from awards that were publicly available as of 
January 1, 2012. Since there is now additional data, future research 
should replicate the analysis. There could be case selection bias. 
Although anecdotal comments suggest the data is representative, this 
has not been empirically confirmed. Further research should consider 
the effect of case selection bias. 
Fourth, it is possible that the models were underspecified. 
Although the case-based variables reliably predicted ITA outcomes 
in the case-based and hybrid models, other case-related variables 
could influence outcome.232 These might involve the presence of third-
party funding, the type of government activity at issue, the underlying 
cause of action, or the industrial sector involved in the dispute. 
Although we were unable to isolate any reliable differences when 
comparing energy disputes with others,233 we nevertheless recognize 
that other factors may contribute meaningfully to a case outcome. 
Likewise, as the tribunal-venue model never reliably predicted ITA 
outcomes, it is possible that introducing more granular information 
about arbitrator identity could predict outcomes. In theory, different 
types of arbitrator experience—such as common and/or civil law 
training, service as counsel or arbitrator in a commercial law dispute, 
involvement in adjudicating public international law disputes, service 
as a government official, background as an academic, or arbitrator 
age—could generate reliable variance.234 As those factors were not 
 
 232. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 32, 179 and accompanying text. 
 234. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, The Influence of Arbitrator 
Background and Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 43, 46–48 
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identifiable in the publicly available arbitration awards, they were 
beyond the scope of this research but could prove fruitful in future 
analyses. Similarly, the venue-related variables might be expanded to 
also explore specific variation in arbitration venues and the applicable 
law at the venue, including whether the enforcement regime involves 
the New York or ICSID Convention.235 
As a result of these cautionary considerations, more research is 
required to create the sufficient power, stability, statistical control, 
and enhanced validity necessary to reach more definitive conclusions. 
It will likely take years—if not decades—before there is a sufficient 
pool of awards available to run the requisite analysis. While it makes 
future research challenging, it does not diminish that this research 
confirms, and expand, upon existing analyses. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to respect the limitations of statistical power and other risks 
of error. 
VII.  DISCUSSION 
These data elucidate ITA and shed some light on whether ITA is 
a predictable form of dispute settlement. The first point is that 
additional research should be done to expand the knowledge base. 
Collecting additional data, conducting balanced and methodologically 
sound research on investors, states, lawyers, amounts claimed, and 
outcomes could provide a more nuanced picture of the state of ITA.236 
Secondly, the data call into question conventional 
characterizations that ITA outcomes exhibit pro-investor bias.237 
Although nontrivial amounts were involved in investor claims, the 
descriptive data either reflected a state-favorable or rough balance in 
outcomes. For the subset of cases where investors won, investors 
 
(2014) (exploring variables related to arbitrator background in FINRA arbitration that 
influence outcomes); Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 26–29, 31–38 (exploring variables related 
to arbitrator identity and outcomes). 
 235. We also explored, using the tribunal-venue model, whether the model varied if we 
switched the ICSID venue variable to look for differences between those awards rendered 
under the ICSID Convention or under the New York Convention. None of those analyses 
indicated that a change in the variable generated a deviation in either the non-significance of 
the model or the predictive utility of individual variables.  
 236. See Reinert, supra note 157, at 846 (making similar suggestions for Bivens litigation).  
 237. Concerns of “pro-investor” bias in ITA should be distinguished from concerns about 
the substantive international law rights granted in treaties. The distinction permits 
disentanglement of claims of “bias” relating to dispute settlement and other concerns about 
systemic balance deriving from a state’s creation of a treaty that affirmatively grants foreign 
investors broad unilateral substantive rights.  
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generally only obtained roughly one-third of their claimed 
compensation. These results were akin to limited plaintiff success in 
whistleblower, qui tam, Bivens, or medical-malpractice litigation, 
which experienced respondent-favorable outcomes. Other empirical 
research on U.S. domestic litigation suggests that success rates in ITA 
were similar to respondent-favorable or state-favorable outcomes. 
Finally, despite concerns about the lack of consistency238 and 
predictability in ITA,239 case-related and hybrid models demonstrated 
that ITA outcomes exhibited a degree of predictability, and the 
results were not completely random. The variables most likely to 
predict outcomes were arguably case selection effects, including 
investor identity and the presence of experienced counsel. 
For investor identity, two variables pointed in somewhat 
different directions and produce a challenging question about which 
investors should benefit from ITA. 
For cases involving people, investors fared relatively well, which 
suggests that ITA provided a critical service for human beings. In 
those circumstances, ITA prevented small, less powerful investors 
from being marginalized because of limited economic and political 
leverage; and it offered small investors an opportunity to obtain legal 
redress for arguable government misconduct. Although human beings 
bringing cases experienced relatively high success rates, these cases 
need not be threatening to states. For example, those cases may have 
involved small investments and small amounts claimed, particularly as 
compared to larger multinationals. Likewise, with cases involving 
small constituencies or closely held corporations, it may be possible to 
generate targeted settlements prior to initiating arbitration that more 
closely align with the individual interests. 
For cases involving larger multinational entities, specifically 
FT500 entities, ITA provided comparatively better relief for large 
investors even though a relatively privileged economic position may 
have provided other ways to redress arguably problematic 
government conduct. Nevertheless, FT500 entities may also have 
experienced economic consequences so severe that their privileged 
 
 238. See generally Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418 (2013) (arguing that the fragmented 
sources of law for investment treaty arbitration make for inherently inconsistent results). See 
also Roberts, supra note 44, at 55 (identifying doctrinal inconsistency in ITA cases); supra note 
149 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of using only publically available data). 
 239. See Note, supra note 11, at 2548. 
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positions were insufficient to redress potential harm. An alternative 
way of understanding the results of investor identity is that some 
investors appreciated the value of their claims, had a firm 
appreciation for the merits of their claims, or had nothing to lose by 
initiating ITA. For individuals, ITA perhaps involved “bet the 
company” disputes where they were aware of the value of their 
investment and had no desire to pursue further investments within a 
host state; and, in those circumstances, ITA perhaps provided the 
only viable method for obtaining meaningful relief. Large 
corporations, meanwhile, may have appreciated that, by suing a state, 
they risked their other commercial interests within the state and 
potentially jeopardized their worldwide reputation. As such, they may 
have been cautious in initiating ITA; and they may have only pursued 
the most meritorious claims or those claims affecting the company’s 
ongoing fiscal viability.240 As these are not the only explanatory 
narratives,241 investor identity remains a critical but complex variable. 
For attorneys, similar to the research of Marc Galanter, the 
results demonstrated that counsel experience predicted outcomes. 
Although experienced counsel affected outcomes for all parties, the 
effect was different for investors and states. 
For investors, having experienced counsel was only linked to two 
types of outcomes, namely whether the state was ever liable (using 
the zero-model) or the amount awarded (using the continuous 
model). This may suggest that sophisticated investors’ counsel was 
adept at distinguishing among cases that were “winners” or might 
generate large awards, and therefore experienced counsel provided a 
critical screening function for investors. But the results may also 
reflect that insider experience in selecting the forum, selecting 
arbitrators, generating claims, and advocacy were critical to 
outcomes. 
For states, having experienced counsel was linked only with 
investors’ relative success, whereby states represented by more 
 
 240. Theoretically, when claimants teeter on bankruptcy, bankruptcy trustees might need to 
pursue claims where a finding of liability is a company’s core asset. Some cases involved 
investors who were in liquidation or bankruptcy. See GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶ 68 (Mar. 31, 2011); Siag & Vecchi v. Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 117 (June 1, 2009); Loewen Group v. United States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶ 29 (June 26, 2003).  
 241. Other explanations might be that tribunals are sympathetic to cases involving 
vulnerable individuals, tribunals are sympathetic to large corporations in difficult political 
situations, the legal merits affected determinations, or some other variable(s).  
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experienced legal teams were associated with outcomes where 
investors did relatively worse. This may suggest that state counsel 
were adept in decreasing investors’ claimed damages by virtue of 
their skill in appointing quality experts, cross-examining the damage 
experts of the investor, or otherwise making an effective case. It could 
also mean, however, that arbitrators were persuadable by 
experienced counsel, that arbitrators were sympathetic to the 
arguments of states, or that tribunals were skilled at identifying 
nonmeritorious damages and reducing liability accordingly. Should 
states negotiating treaties wish to address attorney experience, there 
are two potential options. First, they might attempt to directly 
regulate the legal profession involved in investment dispute 
settlement; this, however, would be a novel tactic. Second, faced with 
a claim, states can actively explore who to retain as defense counsel; 
and data suggested states were best served by counsel with ITA 
experience—but that relationship is not necessarily causal. The 
expertise could derive from developing in-house capacity or 
strategically securing external counsel. 
These observations have policy ramifications. Claims about ITA, 
and derivative normative solutions, should be assessed in light of 
properly gathered and analyzed data. Offering base rate information 
about ITA outcomes aids stakeholders in minimizing the risk of 
cognitive illusions influencing information gathering and decision 
making.242 For states considering excluding ITA from treaties on the 
premise that ITA disfavors them, they may wish to reevaluate that 
proposition as a basis for eliminating ITA. They may also view ITA 
as a way to vindicate appropriate state policy choices. For investors 
hoping to secure relief from ITA, they should appreciate the risks of 
pursuing ITA and the low degree of relative investor success. 
Stakeholders may wish to consider the analyses carefully and respect 
the limitations when engaging in policy debates. By considering 
evidence in context, stakeholders are better positioned to create 
evidence-based normative solutions that redress real, rather than 
imagined, problems. 
Although ITA is not perfect, the data cast doubt on the 
assumption that eradication of ITA is the only solution to perceived 
 
 242. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR 
LAWYERS 73–75 (2012) (describing the cognitive illusions that affect lawyers); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 
1124–28 (1974) (discussing cognitive illusions). 
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problems. Likewise, the data cast doubt on a triumphalist narrative 
about the value of ITA. Rather, the data suggested ITA outcomes are 
complex. Strategic adaptations to a complex problem are more 
normatively appropriate. We propose that, where states choose to 
provide investors with substantive rights, the question should be how 
best to provide dispute resolution. Recognizing that resolution in 
national courts might, fairly or unfairly, generate concerns related to 
perceived bias and any national-court judgment will face substantial 
doctrinal enforcement challenges,243 the objective should be to 
improve dispuFte settlement by making it as efficacious and fair as 
possible. We therefore recommend three structural safeguards. 
First, stakeholders may wish to explore creating an appellate 
body to articulate clear rules, to harmonize inconsistent applications 
of law, and to redress substantive inconsistency.244 Post award clarity 
could generate prospective predictability allowing investors and states 
to organize their conduct in accordance with those determinations. 
The enhanced predictability, determinacy and consistency of 
outcomes could enhance ITA legitimacy.245 Moreover, having clear 
interpretive rules from an appellate body facilitates future 
quantitative modeling that reliably controls for a claim’s legal merits. 
The creation of a reliable legal baseline for analyzing investment 
disputes also promotes complimentary dispute settlement 
mechanisms, such as negotiation and mediation, that depend upon 
clear rules and adjudicative integrity to “bargain in the shadow of the 
law.”246 
Second, should stakeholders be dissatisfied by the degree of 
predictability from the models or otherwise discontent with their 
 
 243. Although there is a convention on enforcement of foreign court judgments, the treaty is 
both of limited scope and not in force and effect. By contrast, international arbitration has a 
robust enforcement regime. Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Court Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 
150–51 (2013). 
 244. For ICSID Convention disputes, the annulment process provides for limited procedural 
grounds for annulling all or part of the award. For New York Convention disputes, there is 
likewise no appeal; but grounds for challenging or setting aside awards are governed by the seat 
of arbitration’s law and limited grounds under the New York Convention.  
 245. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 21, at 1524, 1584–87. 
 246. Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 246–47 (1982); Robert H. 
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L.J. 950, 968–71 (1979); see also Jürgen Kurtz, Australia’s Rejection of Investor-State 
Arbitration: Causation, Omission and Implication, 27 ICSID REV. 65, 69 (2012) (exploring 
difficulties of being unable to “bargain in the shadow of the law”). 
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ability to effectively influence predictors, they may wish to pursue 
other forms of dispute settlement. Negotiation or mediation, for 
example, could compliment, support, or replace ITA. Predispute 
conflict management, negotiation or mediation could eliminate 
formal disputes. Likewise, even after a dispute has crystalized, 
mediation may minimize the scope of the dispute or address conflicts 
that arise during arbitration. Use of these forms of dispute settlement 
could save time and costs. For investors interested in ongoing 
investments within a state, these processes could preserve 
relationships. Mediation also means states need not outsource dispute 
settlement to arbitrators; and parties can retain control over the 
outcome by generating solutions that need not purely involve fiscal 
remuneration. Several treaties recommend “amicable settlement” of 
investment disputes.247 Yet, the broad and undefined reference 
generates confusion, particularly within states, about how settlement 
discussions occur, the procedural ground rules for the discussions, 
who will serve as a mediator (if any), and a myriad of other 
procedural concerns.248 When negotiating treaties, states may 
therefore wish to provide clear guidelines about how, when, and 
where to use alternative forms of dispute settlement. States may wish 
to consider incorporation of the recent Rules for Investor-State 
Mediation249 or create a separate annex providing detail on mediation 
protocols.250 
Third, given the value of providing access to justice for smaller 
entities and people, stakeholders may wish to explore the possibility 
of creating a small-claims facility or other body to provide redress to 
investors that may lack economic and political advantages. For 
human beings who might wish to access dispute settlement, a small 
claims facility could provide immediate, efficient and cost-effective 
access to justice. This solution reflects the success that people 
 
 247. Franck, DSD, supra note 27, at 191–93; see also Note, supra note 11, at 2545 (noting 
that not all treaties provide for amicable settlement of disputes). 
 248. See supra note 27 (identifying sources discussing practices related to amicable 
settlement, negotiation, mediation, and the derivative challenges).  
 249. STATE MEDIATION SUBCOMM., INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA RULES FOR INVESTOR-STATE 
MEDIATION (2012), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=8120ED11-
F3C8-4A66-BE81-77CB3FDB9E9F [http://perma.cc/PHX7-L3TB]. 
 250. This was originally proposed in the European Union-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement ch. 14, annex II (Oct. 5, 2012), http://eu-secretdeals.info/
upload/2014/02/CETA-Dispute-Settlement-Chapter-December-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/5H43-
53RF].  
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experienced, but captures states’ risk by creating a single facility for 
streamlined dispute settlement of small-value claims. 
Ultimately, these recommendations will require assessment and 
adaptation based upon data and the experience of stakeholders. 
Although the results demonstrated ITA was not completely 
unpredictable, states should pursue normative solutions designed to 
improve ITA and dispute settlement. Should states choose to grant 
substantive rights but fail to provide an effective forum for dispute 
settlement, there may be negative externalities that will minimize the 
potential joint gains derived from treaties promoting economic 
integration. In any event, the results of the data necessitate that 
debates about the future of ITA remain both robust and professional. 
Nevertheless, the debate will benefit from evidence-based insights, 
relying on data, and minimizing the influence of nonreplicable 
intuition that may create normative solutions that—while emotively 
satisfying—are suboptimal. 
CONCLUSION 
Without a careful analysis of ITA outcomes, it is not possible to 
generate proper normative reforms. The analyses in this Article 
neither suggested that ITA exhibited a pro-investor bias nor 
otherwise demonstrated that ITA was wholly unpredictable. While 
concern is understandable given the stakes for the international 
political economy, care must be taken to avoid generating dispute 
resolution systems that could generate suboptimal outcomes or 
normative solutions that either redresses the wrong problem or fails 
to address a subsisting harm. 
ITA outcomes were a complicated, multivariate phenomenon, 
and proposals for reform must be tested against data, lest a hasty 
transition harm the economic and political interests of international 
trade and investment agreements. Ultimately, international 
investment law may be best served by designing dispute resolution 
systems tailored to generate meaningful solutions to demonstrable 
problems. By focusing on variables reliably linked to ITA outcomes, 
rather than variables with an intuitive appeal that do not withstand 
empirical scrutiny, stakeholders can properly assess ITA’s value in a 
time of international economic transition. 
 
